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1.0 Introduction 
The European Union (EU) deliberated in 2004-2005 the possible lifting of its arms embargo 
against China. However, the embargo was never lifted, as disagreements among member 
states increased in 2005 and prevented a clear EU consensus on the issue. This demonstrated 
how the fact that an eventual lifting would have had to have been decided by unanimity in the 
European Council complicated the decision process, and how national differences within 
foreign policy may sometimes be too substantial to be resolved. This process of European 
foreign policy coordination therefore becomes the basis of the present thesis’ aim to identify 
the main foreign policy decision makers during the arms embargo debate. 
The changes in international relations after the end of the Cold War1 and the 
Maastricht Treaty’s increased focus on the EU’s political aspect provided a more welcoming 
environment for a potentially more coherent EU foreign policy.2 Even though these structural 
changes within the international environment, and within the EU itself, might have facilitated 
increased foreign policy coordination, it is not, however, evident that member states loosened 
their grip on nationally controlled foreign policy in favour of a supranational EU foreign 
policy.3 Were member states really willing to transfer the same amount of sovereignty in 
foreign policy as they had done in areas such as commercial and agricultural policy? This is a 
central question when investigating whether member states or Community actors4 were the 
main decision makers in the arms embargo case. 
 I have chosen to focus my analysis of European foreign policy making on the EU 
discussions on the lifting of its arms embargo against China in 2004-2005. This embargo, 
together with other sanctions interrupting EU-China relations, was imposed by the 1989 
Madrid European Council as a response to the Chinese repressions of the Tiananmen Square 
                                                 
1
 Knud E. Jørgensen. (2004). “European foreign policy: conceptualising the domain” in W. Carlsnaes, H. Sjursen 
and B. White (eds.). Contemporary European FP. London: Sage Publications, pp. 32-56. 
2
 The two terms ”European foreign policy” and ”EU foreign policy” are both used in the present thesis. The two 
terms also overlap because of the co-existence of different kinds of foreign policy in the EU: Community foreign 
economic policy, CFSP and member state foreign policies. Both terms, nonetheless, refer to the system of 
foreign policy coordination primarily within the EU system. See also Brian White. (1999). “The European 
Challenge to foreign policy analysis.”  European Journal of International Relations, 5 (1), pp. 36-66, pp. 46-47. 
3
 There are different views on the degree member states have been willing to go to in the integration of foreign 
policies. On the one hand, Smith and Allen argues that the emergence of a foreign policy realm within the EU 
have led to an increased convergence of member states’ national foreign policies. On the other hand, Hill, points 
to how foreign policies within the EU remain nationally controlled until there is a federal EU state. Hazel Smith. 
(2002). European Union Foreign Policy; What it is and what it does. London: Pluto Press, pp. 267-275 and 
David Allen (1996). “Conclusions: The European rescue of national foreign policy?” in Christopher Hill (ed.). 
Actors in Europe’s foreign policy. New York: Routledge, pp. 288-304. Christopher Hill. (1993). “Shaping a 
federal foreign policy for Europe.” in Brian Hocking. (ed.). Foreign Relations and federal states. Leicester: 
Leicester University Press, pp. 268-283. 
4
 ”Community actors” refer to supranational EU actors and institutions, such as the Commission, the European 
Parliament and the High Representative for the CFSP. 
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protests in June 1989. However, the following normalisation of affairs in the 1990’s, led to a 
rapid development of EU-China relations and to the establishment of the EU-China strategic 
partnership in 2003. Eventually, this arguably resulted in Chinese, and Franco-German, 
demands for a lifting of the embargo in order for the EU and China to fully enjoy the benefits 
of their partnership. This arms embargo case illustrates the general tensions between the 
different EU member states’ interests, and also between Community foreign economic policy 
and the intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).5 The mix of 
commercial and political interests in the embargo debate was evident in the tension between 
the human rights advocates’ emphasis on the situation in China, and businesses’ interest in 
trade with China. This demonstrated how the “uneasy mix,”6 inherent in the EU-China 
relationship, might have been a source of conflict both within and between member states.  
 In addition to what happened regarding the lifting debate itself, it is also important to 
note how other events in the EU might have affected the handling of the case. During the peak 
of the discussions in 2004 and 2005, the EU was largely preoccupied with preparations and 
adjustments related to its ten-country membership enlargement in 2004. Also, the extensive 
work towards finalising the Lisbon process and the Constitutional treaty added to the EU’s 
work load and might have distracted the agenda away from the arms embargo case.  
1.1 Research question 
The aim of the present thesis is to identify the decisive actors in the EU’s arms embargo 
deliberations. This is grounded on current debates about whether there is an emerging EU 
foreign policy or whether the majority of foreign policy-making remains an area strictly 
reserved for member state governments. Can we see signs of Community actors having 
considerable influence, or were they left on the outside while national governments called the 
shots? The potential evidence of Community influence in this member state dominated policy 
area, would then suggest a major transfer of power to the EU level. In order to be able to say 
something about whether the EU’s foreign policy is mainly governed by member states or 
Community actors, the explicit research question for the present thesis is: 
 
Which actors decided the main course of events during the European Union deliberations on 
a possible lifting of its arms embargo against China in 2004-2005? 
                                                 
5
 David Allen. (1996). “ Conclusions: The European rescue of national foreign policy?” in Christopher Hill (ed.). 
Actors in Europe’s foreign policy. New York: Routledge, pp. 288-304. 
6
 Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan. ( 2008). The foreign policy of the European Union. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 11, pp. 318-322, p. 321. 
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In addition to this main research question about who decided, it is also necessary to consider 
other important aspects of foreign policy coordination within the EU. Were Community actors 
able to influence the course of events despite the fact that arms embargoes were under the 
member states’ jurisdiction? Could the structure of the CFSP itself and the possible 
Europeanization effects have contributed to explaining the EU’s foreign policy system? Also, 
what decided the member states’ positions in the first place? This last question explains why I 
have chosen to include foreign policy analysis (FPA) as a way of exploring the sources of 
member states’ foreign policy positions in the arms embargo case. FPA and the debate about 
whether traditional FPA can be applied to European foreign policy, is thus the main 
theoretical framework of this thesis.   
1.2 Justification of the study  
All studies must be seen in relation to previous work on the subject. This is how one may 
discover certain unexplored aspects or approaches to the issue at hand, which again might 
make the study more interesting and innovative. The next section discusses previous research 
and theoretical approaches related to my study, and considers how the present thesis adds 
something to the already existing approaches.  
1.2.1 Previous research 
The following section looks at three different approaches of previous research on the subject 
of the present thesis: the EU-China relationship, the impact of the arms embargo discussions 
on this relationship and the EU foreign policy system in general.   
 Previous research on the EU-China relationship can also be divided into three different 
approaches: one focusing on the “US factor,” another one based on economic cooperation, 
and a third political one concerning democracy promotion. Scholars, such as Jing and Ross et 
al. adhere to the first and triangular approach which looks at how the Sino-European 
relationship is affected by the EU and China’s respective relationships with the US.7 These 
academics thus focus on how the world’s major powers interact and how this might affect the 
global balance of power. The much discussed “rise of China” may also be placed within this 
                                                 
7
 Jing Men (2007). ”The EU-China strategic partnership: Achievements and challenges.” Policy paper no. 12, 
European Studies center, University of Pittsburgh and Robert S. Ross, Ø. Tunsjø and T. Zhang (eds.) (2010). 
US-China-EU relations : Managing the new world order. London: Routledge. 
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realist approach.8 Algieri, however, belongs to a second group of scholars which avoids 
power politics explanations and looks at how the relationship is conditioned by increased 
interdependence and EU-China trade.9 The third approach to the EU-China relationship 
distances itself from both balance of power-considerations and the primacy of commercial 
interests, as it emphasises the relationship’s political aspects, such as human rights 
compliance and democracy promotion.10 This last approach emphasises the more contentious 
aspects of the EU-China relationship, and it is, as previously mentioned, possible to see how 
the arms embargo case might show how these political and economic objectives may clash as 
the relationship evolves. 
The EU arms embargo against China has been mentioned in studies on the EU-China 
relationship as one of several recent examples of Sino-European tensions. However, there has 
not been done much research on this case specifically. That is why I have chosen to focus the 
present thesis’ analysis on the arms embargo debate in the EU, in order to try to be able to say 
something more about it than the fact that it was a source of EU-China tension. The literature 
which does exist on this particular case also seems to be divided along the abovementioned 
lines of EU-China research. A recurring emphasis on the impact of the transatlantic 
relationship on the EU’s arms embargo discussions confirms this.11 Weinrod, amongst others, 
places himself within this category as he argues that the EU’s stance on the lifting tends to 
accommodate the US’ interests.12 The divide between power politics and economic centred 
approaches is also evident, as Jones, Griffin and Pantucci focus on the transatlantic influence 
on the discussions,13 while Tkacik and Tkacik jr. argue that the arms embargo debate was 
solely shaped by member states’ economic interests.14 
In previous research on European foreign policy in general, one may see a divide 
between scholars focusing on, firstly, the mere existence of a European foreign policy, 
                                                 
8
 For further research on the ’Rise of China,’ please consult: Ming Xia. (n.d.)."China Threat" or a "Peaceful Rise 
of China"? [Electronic version]. The New York Times and   Robert G. Sutter. (2005, February). ”China’s Rise in 
Asia – Promises, Prospects and Implications for the United States.” Asia-Pacific Centre for security studies.   
9
 Franco Algieri. (2002). ”EU economic relations with China: An institutional perspective.” The China 
Quarterly, 169, pp.67-77. 
10
 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton.  (2005). ”Trading human rights: How preferential trade agreements influence 
government repression.” International Organization No. 59, pp.593-629 and Karen E. Smith. (2005). ”Beyond 
the civilian power debate.” Politique Européenne, 1(17), pp. 63-82. 
11
 Bruce W. Weinrod. (2006). “US and European Approaches to China.” Mediterranean Quarterly, 17(2), pp. 
17-31. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Seth G. Jones. (2007). The Rise of European Security Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
Chapter 7, pp. 220-243 and Christopher Griffin and Rafaello Pantucci. (2007) ”A Treacherous Triangle? China 
and the Transatlantic Alliance.” SAIS Review, 27(1), pp. 161-170. 
14
 John Tkacik jr. and John Tkacik. (2005). ”Forgetting Tiananmen: Eager to rebuild trade, EU ignores rights 
violations.” Heritage foundation.  
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secondly, on the primacy of member states, and, thirdly, on the institutional framework of the 
EU’s foreign policy.  
The first approach includes theoretically and FPA-oriented studies, which focus on the 
concept of an emerging independent EU foreign policy as something else than the sum of 
member states’ national foreign policies. Both Jørgensen and Carlsnaes address this 
conceptualisation issue and emphasise the complexity of studying European foreign policy.15 
They approach this complexity by focusing on the overall picture of the EU foreign policy 
landscape. Hill also positions himself within these discussions, as he claims that there can be 
no EU foreign policy without a federal EU state.16 While this macro-level approach is helpful 
for grasping the generalities of a multi-level foreign policy system, a more in-depth study of 
the system’s different actors would be necessary in order to understand how the substructures 
of this system work.  
One of these more in-depth approaches to the study of European foreign policy is the 
second group of scholars, which focuses on the foreign policy systems of different member 
states. Hill, Manners and Whitman belong to this group, as their comparative approach looks 
at how the individual characteristics of member states’ foreign policy systems and traditions 
still control European foreign policy.17 The third approach to the study of European foreign 
policy concentrates on institutional actors. Nuttall, Keukeleire and MacNaughan represent this 
third and more structural approach.18 As opposed to Manners and Whitman, they focus on the 
EU institutions’ influence in European foreign policy, and consequently, take the foreign 
policy debate over to a European level, away from its traditionally national environment. This 
approach’s emphasis on the importance of the institutionalisation of European foreign policy, 
and on the interaction between these institutions, points to a sui generis nature of the EU as a 
foreign policy actor. Kreutz also emphasises this impact of the EU’s institutional framework 
                                                 
15
 Knud E. Jørgensen. (2004). «European foreign policy: conceptualising the domain.” in W. Carlsnaes, H. 
Sjursen and B. White (eds.). Contemporary European FP. London: Sage Publications, pp. 32-56 and Walter 
Carlsnaes. (2004). “Introduction.” in W. Carlsnaes, H. Sjursen and B. White (eds.). Contemporary European FP. 
London: Sage Publications, pp. 1-10. 
16
 Christopher Hill. (1993). “Shaping a federal foreign policy for Europe.” in Brian Hocking. (ed.). Foreign 
Relations and federal states. Leicester: Leicester University Press, pp. 268-283. 
17
 Christopher Hill. (ed.). (1996). Actors in Europe’s foreign policy. New York: Routledge and Ian Manners and 
R. G. Whitman. (eds.). (2000). The foreign policies of European Union member states. New York: Manchester 
University Press. 
18
 Simon Nuttall. (1996). “The Commission: the struggle for legitimacy” in Christopher Hill. (ed.). Actors in 
Europe’s foreign policy. New York: Routledge, Chapter 6, pp. 130-150 and Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer 
MacNaughtan. ( 2008). The foreign policy of the European Union. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
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as he argues that foreign policy actors behave differently according to whether this framework 
have placed them on the “inside” or on the “outside” of the foreign policy making process.19 
Even though Hill’s edited comparative work on the actors of European foreign policy 
does include a chapter on the Commission,20 most studies of European foreign policy seem to 
focus on the prominent roles of either member states or Community actors. This divide 
between member state and institutionally oriented approaches might be explained by the 
constant tension between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism in the European 
integration process. The limited existence of research on European foreign policy which 
includes both the national and Community level, thus justifies the approach of the present 
thesis’ analysis. The following analysis consequently aims to look at both types of actors, 
Community and member state, in order to get a more complete picture of the arms embargo 
case and possibly of the European foreign policy system in general. Even though such an 
approach may still conclude that one of these two types of actors was indeed more important, 
it is still interesting to look at both in order to evaluate the difference. This combined angle 
thus has the possibility of expanding the comparative member state approach by including an 
analysis of Community actors, while it, at the same time, may add something to the 
institutional approach, by considering the domestic sources of the participating member 
states’ positions.  
1.2.2 Theoretical framework 
I have chosen foreign policy analysis to be the theoretical framework of the present thesis as it 
will help analyse the domestic sources of the member states’ foreign policies.  FPA’s aim to 
identify foreign policy influences will thus help to answer my research question about who 
the main decision makers in the arms embargo case were, and it will also justify the choice of 
FPA as the present thesis’ theoretical framework. This theoretical framework is more 
extensively discussed in chapter two of the present thesis.  
As opposed to other grand theories of international relations, such as realism and 
liberalism, FPA is more focused on analysing what is already there rather than predicting 
what might happen. Even though realism could have been a useful tool for analysing how 
member states acted as unitary and self-interested actors in the arms embargo case,21 I have 
chosen to open the realists’ “black box” and look at domestic sources of the member states’ 
                                                 
19
 Joakim Kreutz. (2004). “Reviewing the EU Arms Embargo on China: the clash between value and rationale in 
European Security Strategy.” The Central European review of international affairs, 22, pp. 43-58. 
20
 Christopher Hill. (ed.). (1996). Actors in Europe’s foreign policy. New York: Routledge.   
21
 Kenneth N. Waltz. (1979). Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw Hill. 
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positions. Also, the realists’ emphasis on the anarchic environment of international relations, 
and their scepticism towards international institutions, would have excluded the EU’s 
institutional framework and the non-state EU actors from the analysis.22 Liberalism’s focus on 
preferences, interdependence and the importance of international institutions is thus much 
closer to my approach.23 However, while liberalism could have been a suitable theoretical 
framework, I have chosen to base my analysis on Moravcsik’s liberal agency centred FPA in 
order to focus more explicitly on the sources of foreign policy preferences in International 
Relations (IR). Moravcsik presents a liberal FPA which focuses, firstly, on how groups within 
the domestic society influence the government’s foreign policy formation, secondly, on how 
governments represent the interests of subsets of their societies, and thirdly, on how nationally 
defined foreign policies may be transformed in an international setting.24 
While Moravcsik’s abovementioned domestically oriented FPA should be ideal in 
explaining the sources of the member states’ position in the arms embargo discussions, it is 
not, however, evident that this framework can be successfully applied to the actions of 
Community actors and to the possible Europeanization effects. Instead of disregarding liberal 
FPA because of these challenges, I have chosen to investigate whether traditional FPA has to 
be supplemented with additional IR theories, such as Europeanization, or replaced with a new 
type of FPA, in order to successfully analyse European foreign policy. This is also in line with 
current debates about the state-centred FPA’s applicability to a changing and possibly post-
state European foreign policy.25 Most of the previous research on the applicability of 
traditional FPA has, however, mainly focused on the EU’s foreign policy system in general. 
That is why I aim to explore whether traditional FPA may more easily explain one CFSP-
case, instead of the institutional structure of the EU foreign policy system.  The present thesis, 
in addition to its main purpose of analysing which actors where the decisive ones in the arms 
embargo case, thus also looks at whether traditional liberal FPA may be a sufficient 
framework for this analysis. This would potentially contribute to the current debates about the 
applicability of traditional FPA to the evolving and perhaps sui generis character of EU 
foreign policy.  
                                                 
22
 Jack Donnelly. (2009). ”Realism,” in Burchill, A. et al. (Eds.). Theories of international relations.  (4th ed.). 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 2, pp. 31-56.  
23
 Robert O. Keohane and J. S. Nye. (2001). Power and interdependence (3rd ed.). New York: Harper Collins 
Publishers. 
24
 Andrew Moravcsik. (2006). “Preferences and power in the European Community: A liberal 
intergovernmentalist approach.” in Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (Ed.) Debates on European integration. 
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 11, pp. 264-303. 
25
 Please see chapter two, section 2.3, for a more in-depth description of the discussions concerning traditional 
FPA’s applicability in Europe. 
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1.3 Approach and sources 
The present thesis evaluates the different actors’ competences, positions, and actions during 
the arms embargo discussions. The course of events, from the Chinese request for a lifting in 
2003, until the EU dropped the subject in late 2005, is considered together with a more 
detailed analysis of the foreign policy influences within the EU and its member states. The 
analysis of the member states focuses primarily on the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, 
France and Sweden. I have chosen France and Germany because of how they initiated the 
debate on a possible lifting,26 and because of their position as two of the three larger EU 
states, the “big three,” which traditionally play an essential role in shaping EU foreign 
policy.27 The UK is another natural choice considering its place as the last of these three 
larger EU states. Also, its self-proclaimed role as a bridge between the EU and its “special 
partner,” the US, could suggest that it would be an interesting point of analysis, in order to see 
whether member states’ external bilateral relationships influence EU policy making.28 Sweden 
comes into the analysis not as one of the “big three,” but as a neutral and more recent member 
state, with perhaps a different domestic political system than the other three. The choice of 
Sweden can also be justified by the possible domestic tensions between the importance of 
Swedish defence industry, and Sweden’s embeddedness within the Nordic countries’ tradition 
for human rights advocacy.29 
 Even though the present thesis also aims to say something about the EU’s foreign 
policy system in general, it must, however, be noted that one case cannot explain the wide 
range of foreign policy issues in the EU. One must also consider that decisions are often taken 
by individuals acting as a member state representative or Community actor and that this 
would mean that the “general” behaviour of a particular actor may change as there is a change 
of member state Governments or Community offices. There will always be case-specific 
factors differentiating one case from the general tendency, but a certain degree of 
generalisation may, nonetheless, help explain some of the underlying generalities of European 
foreign policy. This generalisation is also desirable for the sake of the development of the 
study. 
                                                 
26
 Richard A. Bitzinger. (2004, December 31). ” A Prisoner's Dilemma: The EU's China Arms Embargo” 
[Electronic version].  China Brief. 
27
 Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan. ( 2008). The foreign policy of the European Union. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 5, pp. 124-147. 
28
 Brian White. (2001). Understanding European FP. New York: Palgrave, Chapter 6, pp.118-14i and Hugo 
Young. (1999). This blessed plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair. London: Overlook. 
29
 Nicola Casarini. (2006, October). ”The evolution of the EU-China relationship: from constructive engagement 
to strategic partnership.” European Union Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper, 64. 
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Official documents, previous research on the subject and newspaper articles make up 
the three main groups of sources for the present thesis’ analysis. The first group, official 
documents, provides primary sources which are important proofs of the different actors’ 
official positions. The present thesis considers a wide range of primary sources in order to be 
able to fulfil the abovementioned aim of providing an analysis of both member state and 
Community actors in European foreign policy.  Commission Policy papers on the EU-China 
relationship, Presidency Conclusions from the European Council and European Parliament 
(EP) Resolutions on the arms embargo are some examples of official EU documents included 
in the present thesis’ analysis. Also, speeches made by the Commission President and the 
Commissioner for External Relations, available from the different EU institutions’ web 
archives, have been useful for identifying the EU’s official positions. These primary 
documents are interesting as they present actors’ views without the additional interpretations 
inherent in secondary sources. However, it is also important to be aware of some of these 
sources’ limits. For example, the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council are 
essential documents for identifying its main decisions, but the collegial nature of the 
European Council creates vague conclusions without any reference to which member states 
opted for which solutions during the deliberations. This may be a way of projecting an image 
of a strong and united EU, but it also makes it difficult, if not impossible, for researchers to 
analyse the internal processes within the European Council. However, they still serve as 
important points of reference for the general priorities of the EU. Another aspect worth 
considering is the fact that the contents of the member states’ Presidency programmes, of 
China and the EU Commission’s policy papers on each other and of other official statements 
might not be the actual agenda or position of the issuer, but the result of a deliberate strategy 
or diplomatic niceties created to please their audiences. This may suggest that the formulation 
of official documents might also have been affected by the socialisation effect inherent in the 
social-constructivist “logic of appropriateness.”30 This considered, they are, nonetheless, 
useful documents emphasising the working programmes and agendas of these institutions.  
Published provisional agendas and press releases of minutes from the Council and the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) have also been used as a way of 
assessing the amount of time granted to the lifting discussions and, consequently, how highly 
they were prioritised. However, since these documents present the institutions’ provisional 
agenda, it is not evident that they were completely followed in the actual meetings. However, 
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they still give an idea of the amount of work planned for that given session. Moreover, 
minutes from plenary sessions in the EP, available in the EP’s online archives, have been a 
way of assessing the different members of the European Parliament’s (MEPs) positions on the 
arms embargo lifting. Furthermore, online documents reproducing debates in the Swedish, 
British and French Parliaments, as well a resolution from the German Bundestag, have been 
crucial in the work of evaluating whether domestic political actors in the member states 
favoured the lifting. It is, however, also important to note that members of parliament (MPs) 
expressing their discontent, might not be representing the whole party group. Other sources of 
information on the arms embargo and about the EU’s international human rights policy have 
been speeches from the EU’s delegation to Norway’s 2010 seminar on human rights31 and 
publications by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as the British Campaign 
Against Arms Trade (CAAT). In considering these sources, it is also important to keep in 
mind that this human rights seminar and the interest groups may possibly provide more 
single-sided accounts of the arms embargo case.  
In addition to the abovementioned primary sources, I have also chosen to base the 
present analysis on a number of secondary sources. Previous research is central to any study, 
as it places the analysis into a wider context, and provides different scholars’ interpretations 
of the subject. As accounted for above, there is an extensive amount of existing literature on 
the different aspects of European foreign policy. A large number of these has been included in 
the present thesis, but I have chosen to focus on Manners and Whitman and Hill’s 
comparative studies on member states’ foreign policies and Keukeleire and MacNaughtan’s 
institutional studies, as they each focus on the different main actors treated in the analysis.32 It 
is, however, also important to note that some conclusions within previous research might be 
outdated or less relevant because of the constantly evolving nature of the EU. Previous 
research is, nonetheless, an essential supplement to official documents, as they may help 
provide a more analytical account.  
Newspaper articles have also been an important source of key actors’ statements when 
official documents have been hard to come by. Articles from the EU observer and several 
Chinese online media, in particular, have been helpful in identifying the course of events of 
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the arms embargo discussions, especially as these media are focused on the internal EU 
processes and on China’s wish to emerge from the “arms embargo discrimination,” 
respectively. It is, however, also essential to note that different newspapers may be biased 
towards certain positions or societal groups, and that English versions of Chinese newspaper 
articles may present a different view than the original article. However, much because of the 
recent nature of the arms embargo case, they were, nonetheless, important sources of 
information regarding how the arms embargo debates progressed and developed.  
1.4 Thesis outline and main arguments  
The next chapter presents FPA as the theoretical framework of the present thesis and outlines 
the particular approach chosen for this case study: Moravcsik’s liberal agency-based FPA. 
The second chapter also explores some of the challenges which FPA faces in a changing 
European foreign policy environment, and discusses the possibilities of a new supplemented 
or transformed European FPA with Europeanization as an additional explanatory factor. 
 Chapter three describes the development of EU-China relations since the formal 
establishment of diplomatic ties in the 1970’s, and considers the relationship’s different 
aspects and points of disagreement. It also places the arms embargo discussions within the 
wider context of an evolving strategic partnership between two economic giants, and 
emphasises how the lack of a unitary EU foreign policy might affect the process and outcome 
of EU-China cooperation. Here, it is also argued that the debate on the lifting of the arms 
embargo was partly the inevitable result of an improved and developed EU-China 
relationship, as China was in a strengthened position to ask for more in return for access to the 
growing Chinese market. 
Chapter four explores the institutional context of the arms embargo case, and the 
positions and possible impact of EU institutions. Firstly, it considers the possibility for 
Community actors, with limited formal CFSP competences, of influencing the arms embargo 
debate. Secondly, it points to how governments, with CFSP competences, may be formally 
trapped between the national and supranational in intergovernmental EU institutions, while 
national interests continue to define their actions. The main argument here is that even though 
Community actors seemed to want to make an impact, by actively expressing their opposition 
or support for the lifting, their influence was still marginal as long as their formal CFSP 
competences were limited.  
 Chapter five discusses the member states’ actions and emphasises how the unanimity 
rule guaranteed their primacy. Firstly, it explores the influence of domestic actors in the 
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foreign policy formation process of four EU member states. The chapter states that the 
increased centralisation of foreign policy around the office of the Prime Minister was one of 
the main sources of member states’ foreign policy positions, while the impact of other 
domestic actors seemed to vary according to each member state. The chapter also considers 
how the arms embargo case was affected by the member states’ national priorities during their 
EU Presidencies, and, finally, it points to the important US’ impact on EU affairs.  
 Chapter six provides an analysis of European foreign policy and seeks to identify 
some of its main traits based on the arms embargo case. Firstly, it emphasises how the 
member states were indeed the decisive actors. The CFSP remained controlled by member 
states much because of how the unanimity-based structure of the CFSP hindered the 
development of a supranationally structured EU foreign policy. Secondly, it demonstrates that 
while traditional liberal FPA can help explain some of the domestic aspects of the arms 
embargo debate, there are certain factors which remain unaccounted for by this state-centric 
FPA approach. The non-state EU actors’ potential influence and the vertical and horizontal 
effects of Europeanization are two of these aspects which emphasise how traditional FPA is 
not completely sufficient when analysing European foreign policy. However, chapter six 
concludes by pointing to how the continuation of an issue-specific traditional liberal FPA, 
with an added element of Europeanization theory, may be justified as long as European 
foreign policy remains a differentiated system of several institutional and decision making 
regimes, and as long as the CFSP remains intergovernmental.  
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2.0 Foreign policy analysis in a changing Europe 
Foreign policy analysis (FPA) is a theoretical subfield of International Relations (IR), which 
aims to explain the foreign policies of a state, based on different theories of social sciences.33 
While Carlsnaes has classified the different perspectives of FPA with an elaborate matrix,34 
Hudson and Vore have presented the analysis’ three recurring main approaches: a domestic 
approach based on national sources of foreign policy, an approach focused on decision-
making and lastly, a psycho-milieu approach centred on the cognitive explanations of foreign 
policy.35 As previously mentioned, I have chosen Moravcsik’s liberal FPA perspective, 
belonging to the first and domestic approach, as the basis for my analysis.  
The purpose of this chapter is to present the theoretical framework of the following 
analysis of the arms embargo discussions in 2004-2005. The chapter begins by defining the 
traditional framework of FPA and by pointing out the different dichotomies within the field. 
Secondly, it presents Moravcsik’s liberal agency-based FPA approach. Finally, it explores the 
challenges to traditional FPA in post-Cold War Europe and points to the current debates about 
the potential of a distinct European FPA. As a part of this, it also introduces Europeanization 
theory as a possible supplement to the theoretical framework. 
2.1 Foreign policy analysis  
The analysis of foreign policy also calls for a definition of foreign policy itself. Scholars seem 
largely to agree that foreign policy is the action taken by one government towards a group 
beyond its borders.36 Despite this arguably general agreement on the definition of foreign 
policy, there are, however, some divergences. Hudson points to governments’ primacy in 
foreign policy making,37 while Hill emphasises how other independent and non-governmental 
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actors may also have their own foreign policy.38 Similarly to Hudson, Moravcsik’s liberal 
FPA points to the states as the main foreign policy makers.39 However, he also points to how 
the state is not an international actor in itself, but “a representative institution, constantly 
subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social 
actors.”40 He thus acknowledges the important role of non-governmental actors’ preferences 
within a state’s foreign policy formation, which could suggest that his approach is in general 
more positively oriented towards non-governmental actors as foreign policy makers. These 
different interpretations of foreign policy actors point to an essential element of the debate 
about whether the EU has or may develop a unitary foreign policy. Will foreign policy 
making remain reserved for the state or may other independent actors, such as the EU, be 
allowed to enter the stage?  
The fact that foreign policy includes both internal and external aspects places it at the 
crossroads of domestic policies and international relations. Carlsnaes points to this mix by 
explaining how the early years of FPA were marked by a debate about whether it belonged to 
the study of public policy or to International Relations.41 Hill further emphasises this dilemma 
by pointing to how the internal and external origins of foreign policy emphasise how this 
particular policy area might have to be analysed differently than other public policies.42 This 
might again show how different scholars’ foci on the domestic or on the international aspects 
of foreign policies have led to the development of different FPA approaches.43 The absence of 
a general theory of FPA, and consequently the lack of clearly defined analysis criteria, leave it 
up to the analyst to choose between a number of available FPA approaches.44 These 
approaches are more commonly categorised into actor- or structure-based studies, 
domestically or internationally oriented research or works based either on the process or on 
the outcome of foreign policies.45 Despite these contrasting perspectives, state-centrism and 
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the importance of looking inside the ”black box”46 of the state in order to identify the sources 
of foreign policies, are often considered main criteria ground for most FPA approaches.47  
As previously stated, there are three main FPA approaches which still remain the 
field’s principal points of reference.48 Firstly, James Rosenau’s comparative approach laid the 
foundations for the domestic approach to FPA, where it is essential to look inside the state 
structures to uncover domestic sources of foreign policies.49 The second FPA approach, based 
on Richard Snyder’s decision making theories, focuses on the process of foreign policy 
making and provides a link between FPA and organisational theory.50 The last, and perhaps 
most contested strand of FPA, is the psychological milieu approach. Harold and Margaret 
Sprout’s study of the psychological context and the predispositions of decision makers is on a 
level beyond the objective analysis of foreign policies.51 Carlsnaes places these 
abovementioned different FPA-approaches into a matrix of four main perspectives: one 
structural, one agency-based, one social-institutional and, lastly, one interpretative actor 
perspective.52 These four perspectives have again been categorised according to the foreign 
policy dichotomies of collectivism-individualism and objectivity-subjectivity. 
While FPA is pointed to as the better alternative to a “black box” view of the state,53 
neo-realists challenge this by arguing that the unitary rational state’s relative power and its 
position within the international system are the only factors that can explain a state’s foreign 
policy.54 Waltz, a neo-realist, claims that it is impossible to find an explanatory generalising 
theory if one is to focus on states’ preferences as the level of analysis.55 He also argues that 
while international relations and foreign policies are linked, they explain entirely different 
things.56 It is also evident that neo-realism’s structural emphasis on relative power distribution 
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and on how the state’s relative position within the international system decides that state’s 
foreign policy, clearly contradicts FPA’s focus on the internal factors of the state itself. 
Consequently, the neo-realist view of the state as a “billiard ball” cannot be equalled to FPA’s 
state-centrism.57 
 Despite neo-realists’ criticism of FPA as being of limited use in a world where states 
are arguably unitary and rational actors, I have chosen FPA as the theoretical framework for 
the present thesis. This is because I believe that we can get a more differentiated and nuanced 
analysis of a case by including domestic factors from the inside of the ”black box,” even 
though the international system itself may also influence foreign policy formation. I believe 
that the study of the 2004-2005 debate on the lifting of the arms embargo, is embedded within 
the analysis of the sources of the different member states’ foreign policy positions and within 
the investigation of how these positions converged and clashed with each other and with EU 
level actors. However, because of FPA’s state-centrism, the EU level may be a challenging 
level of analysis for traditional FPA. This challenge will then serve as the starting point for 
the present thesis’ additional assessment of whether a new and European FPA framework is 
needed.  
2.2 Moravcsik’s domestic approach to foreign policy analysis 
Because of the eclectic nature of FPA, it is essential to choose one of the many FPA 
approaches in order to be able to perform a somewhat coherent analysis of a given case study. 
I have chosen to base my FPA framework on Moravcsik’s liberalist approach. This theoretical 
framework is one of the individualist and objectivist agency-based perspectives from 
Carlsnaes’ matrix and belongs to the domestic strand of FPA.58 Moravcsik aims to free 
liberalism of the realists’ recurring criticism of it being a utopian theory, and he further points 
to the necessity of moving away from the realist assumptions of the state as a rational, unitary 
actor in order to look at domestic sources of states’ given preferences.59 Hill also agrees with 
Moravcsik by stating that foreign policy can never be removed from its domestic context.60 
Moravcsik presents three core assumptions of his liberalist approach to FPA: the 
primacy of societal groups, the representative function of governments and the 
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interdependence within the international system.61 The primacy of societal actors and the 
assumption that their positions are prior to politics, point to the bottom-up aspect of foreign 
policy. Here, Moravcsik focuses on how societal groups identify their preferences and then 
export them to the state level via political exchange and collective action.62 An example of 
how societal groups influence the foreign policy preferences of governments is how the 
interests of agricultural groups affected, and still affect, French foreign and European policy.63  
The second assumption focuses on the state’s representative function and on how the 
government always represents interests of certain groups within the domestic society.64 
Governments define the states’ interests according to who they represent and subsequently 
operate according to these interests in international relations. This is reinforced by the fact 
that many political parties are still founded on the interests of certain societal groups or 
commercial business interest. One example of this is the labour parties’ connection with 
labour organisations.  As previously mentioned, the state becomes an actor in international 
relations only because of its representative function. Finally, the assumption regarding the 
interdependence between states in the international system, points to how some states’ 
national interests may constrain the room to manoeuvre of other states.65 Here it is necessary 
to look at national interests within an international setting, and this is perhaps especially 
imminent in the case of EU member states, as they all take part in a larger framework of 
foreign policy coordination. This last assumption also adds a structural dimension to the 
agency-based perspective, seeing that international interdependence is often based on 
international institutions or structures.  
I have chosen this particular FPA framework because of the fact that these 
assumptions aim to analyse a wide range of domestic sources of foreign policy. The arms 
embargo case’s belonging within the intergovernmental context of the CFSP makes it 
important to explore how and to what extent these member state positions were affected 
before they reached the negotiation table in the European Council. Moravcsik’s three core 
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assumptions thus create the framework of my domestically oriented analysis. Firstly, the 
importance of societal actors and domestic social demands is explored through considering 
whether domestic societal groups affected the formation of member states’ positions in the 
EU arms embargo deliberations. Secondly, it is evaluated whether government representatives 
defined state preferences based on particular subsets of domestic society, and perhaps 
especially whether defence industries or other business interests were represented. Thirdly, 
the possible constraints of other states’ interests and the interdependence within the 
international system are considered in the analysis of the interaction of the sometimes 
diverging member states positions. 
The complex and “low politics”-nature of the arms embargo case and its potential of 
engaging a range of different actors, defence companies, Chinese lobbying groups, businesses 
with commercial ties with China, and human rights activists, make it even more important to 
consider the possible domestic sources of the member states’ positions. Putnam’s “two-level 
game” also points to this domestic aspect of international negotiations and shows how a 
domestic FPA approach may be useful for analysing foreign policy coordination in the EU’s 
CFSP.66 Moravcsik and Nicolaidis point to this coexistence of a domestic and international 
environment as they argue that while governments in the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations 
“were concerned above all to avoid the impression of symbolic failure, they remained 
concerned to avoid any domestic ratification controversy (...).”67 This two-level game thus 
refers to how governments, in international negotiations, must consider how their actions are 
being received by both their domestic constituents and by their international negotiation 
partners. This can also be argued to be describing elements of the relationship between 
Moravcsik’s first and third assumption, connecting the pressure from societal groups with the 
constraints posed by other states in the international environment.  
The fact that I have chosen to focus on a liberalist and agency-based FPA approach, 
does not, however, mean that structural FPA is irrelevant in this particular case. The impact of 
Europeanization and of the CFSP structure itself on foreign policy making in the EU, is 
therefore assessed in chapter six of the present thesis. I have, nonetheless, mainly focused on 
the agency-based approach, much because of how the unanimity rule and the 
intergovernmental nature of the CFSP point to the primacy of member state actions. Also, this 
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focus on the agents and their behaviour is essential in order to be able to answer the research 
question about which actors were the main decision makers in the arms embargo case.   
While Moravcsik’s liberal FPA seems to be vital in the task of analysing the different 
member states’ foreign policy positions, the abovementioned EU structure, where non-
governmental actors might claim a more important role in EU foreign policy making, suggests 
that traditional FPA may encounter a growing number of challenges as the EU’s foreign 
policy system evolves. These potential clashes between traditional state-centred FPA and a 
possibly post-state EU foreign policy are further discussed in the following section. 
2.3 The European Union: a challenge to traditional foreign policy analysis? 
According to Jørgensen, the end of the Cold War led to an increased interest in European 
foreign policy and changed both its content and conduct.68 This marked a gradual move away 
from the realist Cold War paradigm of a black and white view of the world. It also paved way 
for a “softer” definition of foreign- and security policy, which was more in line with the ideas 
of European integration. Consequently, one could argue that this change facilitated further 
developments of a united European foreign policy and opened the door to multicausal 
analyses of foreign policy beyond the primacy of national governments.69 
 As the abovementioned changes might have marked the beginning of a more coherent 
and supranational EU foreign policy, White is one of several scholars who have studied how 
this development might create challenges for the existing FPA.70 The establishment of the 
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy with the Maastricht Treaty, and further 
developments during the 1990’s, illustrated how this policy field had evolved since the 1970’s 
EPC, while it still maintained the strictly intergovernmental nature of EU foreign policy 
coordination.71 Despite this continued intergovernmentalism and member state primacy, 
Smith, nonetheless, argues that the establishment of the CFSP led to an extensive and 
effective EU foreign policy covering all aspect of foreign relations.72  
White identifies three types of “European foreign policy,” in order to clarify this 
potentially broad term: the Community-oriented foreign economic policy, the 
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intergovernmental CFSP and the member states’ national foreign policies.73 These three 
parallel types of foreign policy, together with the co-existence of member states and EU-level 
actors, illustrate how the EU could be considered a multi-level polity with a multi-layered 
foreign policy.74 The different and parallel foreign policy configurations within this non-state 
actor, where foreign economic policies and political foreign policies are divided into two 
different regimes, respectively, thus pose a set of challenges to traditional FPA.75 Also, the 
potential emergence of supranational EU actors as the decision makers of an independent EU 
foreign policy emphasises how a traditionally state-centric FPA might have difficulties 
explaining this unorthodox foreign policy environment. Furthermore, the increased 
Europeanization of member states’ domestic politics and the fact that member states’ foreign 
policies towards other member states within the tightly knit EU structure can no longer be 
considered as purely “foreign,”76 also complicates the analysis of a state’s foreign policy.  
 The abovementioned state-centrism of traditional FPA is often viewed as the main 
obstacle to applying FPA to the foreign policy actions of non-governmental EU actors.77 
However, White also argues that FPA is more often defined as actor-centred rather than state-
centred, and that it may therefore be adapted as the nature of foreign policy actors change.78 
Another central point of deliberation is whether the EU should be considered an independent 
foreign policy actor or merely another international organisation.79 This is the foundation for 
the ongoing debate between the state-centrists and Europeanists’ views on FPA of EU 
member states, where the former sees the EU as just another international organisation while 
the latter points to the EU as an independent foreign policy actor.80  
As previously noted, the changes in the realm of post-Cold War European foreign 
policy have sparked several debates concerning the applicability of traditional FPA. Ginsberg 
argues that the multidimensional structure of contemporary European foreign policy makes it 
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impossible to analyse it with only one theory.81 One suggestion has been to combine the 
existing FPA with other IR approaches. Europeanization theory has been one of the 
approaches considered as an addition to the traditional FPA framework.82 Wong outlines three 
categories of Europeanization which would be particularly helpful in analysing its effect on 
national foreign policy making.83 Firstly, a top-down perspective of national adaptation, 
which explores how domestic structures and policies are being influenced by the country’s 
participation in the European integration process. Secondly, a bottom-up perspective, which 
focuses on the projection of national preferences to the European level, where the EU 
becomes a “vehicle for national goals.”84 Lastly, a cross-level socialisation process, which 
looks at how preferences and identities may be redefined according to the ”logic of 
appropriateness,” and as a result of regular interaction between national and European 
representatives.85 This last constructivist element of Europeanization theory emphasises the 
possibility of change in actors’ values and preferences as a consequence of socialising with 
other actors.86 This interaction leads to a sense of community, which consequently becomes 
the foundation for this community’s “logic of appropriateness.” Contrary to realists’ “logic of 
consequence,” this constructivist logic explains how actors behave according to what the 
other members of their community find appropriate.87 
Europeanization theory’s focus on the effects of regular interaction within the EU 
framework thus makes it a particularly suitable addition to the present thesis’ theoretical 
framework of a mainly nationally focused traditional FPA. This is because it may identify an 
entirely different set of influences in national foreign policy formation. That is why I have 
chosen to evaluate whether this additional focus on Europeanization effects could be useful in 
the analysis of the arms embargo case.  
In addition to the idea of combining traditional FPA with other IR approaches, there 
are others who discuss the possibility of developing a distinct FPA for European foreign 
policy. While White advocates the continuation of a slightly adapted traditional FPA, 
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Manners and Whitman opt for a completely transformed European FPA, and Smith points to 
the possibility of operating with different FPA according to the issue-area in question.88 
Larsen also proposes such an issue-specific FPA framework, where the level of EU 
involvement and national advocacy in each respective case decides what kind of FPA will be 
applied.89 This approach is based on three different FPA frameworks: firstly, a traditional 
state-centred FPA where the EU is just one of many international organisations, secondly, a 
transformed FPA which would account for new actors and the merging of national and EU 
discourses, and lastly, a post-modern FPA which mixes the two first frameworks, in order to 
consider both the state and the EU as significant foreign policy actors.  
The present thesis’ study of the arms embargo case explores whether Moravcsik’s 
traditional liberalist FPA still could be considered a sufficient framework of analysis in the 
arguably changed foreign policy realm of Europe. Here, the argued state-centrism of 
traditional FPA and the focus on domestic sources of foreign policy are some of the central 
points of consideration. In addition to this FPA framework, I also consider whether 
Europeanization could be an additional explanation of foreign policy positions as member 
states interact with each other and with EU institutions in a complex system of cooperation 
and coordination. The question remains thus whether a traditional FPA framework still could 
be applicable, or whether additional approaches, such as Europeanization, or a transformation 
of traditional FPA would be needed.   
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3.0 The EU-China relationship: from trade agreement to strategic 
partnership 
In the EU’s90 European Security Strategy from 2003, A secure Europe in a better world, 
China is emphasised as one of the EU’s most important strategic partners.91 With this in mind, 
the chapter aims to provide a helpful context for the following chapters’ analysis of the 2004-
2005 arms embargo discussions. This is done by demonstrating just how important and 
substantial the EU-China relationship is and how this has, in turn, been influenced by the 
gradual development of the EU’s international role. 
 Firstly, the chapter considers how this relationship has often been characterised by a 
mix of rapprochements and tensions, where economic relations always seem to have the upper 
hand. Secondly, it explores how these rapidly developing economic relations hit a politically 
rough patch after the Chinese repressions of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. Thirdly, 
it looks at how the tensions following the Tiananmen events were quickly reversed by a 
fifteen year long phase of normalisation of affairs in the EU-China relationship. And lastly, it 
considers how the high point of EU-China relations in the end of 2003 arguably initiated the 
EU’s debate on the status of its arms embargo against China. 
3.1 A trade-oriented start for the EU-China relationship  
The establishment of the EU’s foreign policy mechanism in 1970, the European Political 
Cooperation (EPC),92 formalised the coordination of member states’ national foreign policies 
and launched the possible beginning of a more unified European approach to international 
affairs. It remained, nonetheless, mainly an arena for joint declarations, to which member 
states could, at will, subscribe. In the context of these joint declarations on international 
events, the EU collectively recognised the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1975 after 
signs of modernisation in the PRC and as a result of increasing trade between the two.93 The 
fact that both the PRC and the Republic of China, also known as Taiwan, strived to be 
recognised as the international society’s legitimate China, complicated the two Chinas’ 
relationship with the rest of the world. Also, even though the UK, Luxemburg and Denmark 
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had recognised the PRC already in the 1950’s, most member states waited until the beginning 
of the 1970’s, thus making it difficult for the EU to establish formal relations with China up 
until this point. The formalisation of the EU-China relationship came about after the end of 
the Chinese Cultural Revolution in 1976 and the emergence of the PRC’s “open door policy,” 
following Mao Zedong’s death in 1976.94 These internal reforms in the PRC95 consequently 
paved way for another economic climate, which facilitated an EU-China agreement on deeper 
economic cooperation: first with the 1978 trade agreement and then with the upgraded 1985 
trade and economic cooperation agreement. 
The 1978 trade agreement introduced the most-favoured-nation treatment between the 
EU and China in matters regarding import and export charges.96 The 1985 trade and economic 
cooperation agreement maintained the regulations from 1978, but brought the cooperation to a 
new level by formalising the EU and China’s intentions of developing economic cooperation 
within areas such as industry and energy. The agreement’s goal of achieving a trade balance 
also called for an increased favourable treatment of EU imports in China as well as a gradual 
liberalisation of Chinese imports into the EU.97 
 The 1980’s became a decade where both the EU and China experienced internal 
economic developments as they also increased their standing in the world.98 The EU’s focus 
on completing and improving its Single Market through the Single European Act of 1985 
strengthened its “actorness” and contributed to increased interdependence between its 
member states. The EU’s increased participation in the international arena was also visible 
through the abovementioned establishment of the EPC and by the fact that the EU was 
actively engaged in the more “soft security” aspects in the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. The EU-China relationship was, however, mostly steered by 
economic cooperation, and consequently by the Community-oriented foreign economic 
policy.  
The reforms in China in the 1980’s triggered EU support for further development as 
well as the establishment of several programs of cooperation within science and technology.99 
China’s rapid development also soon allowed it to establish itself as an important global actor, 
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and it was this change of status which eventually led international actors to start considering 
the abovementioned “rise of China.” Some scholars have also tried to point to these shifts in 
the international system’s balance of power as an explanation for the gradual development of 
the EU-China relationship during the Cold War, by emphasising the sense of community in 
having the USSR as a common adversary.100 This positive development of relations in the 
1980’s did not however last the entire decade, as the repressions of the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square protests led to a disruption of EU-China relations. 
3.2 The 1989 events as a catalyst for the relationship’s human rights dimension 
The economic predominance of the EU-China relationship in the 1980’s was supplemented by 
a human rights dimension with the EU’s reactions to the repressions of the Tiananmen Square 
uprising in June 1989. Despite a substantial growth in EU-China trade, which had developed 
from virtually nothing in the early 1970’s up to one per cent of the EU’s total foreign trade in 
1989,101 the Madrid European Council of June 1989 clearly stated that the EU would not let 
the Tiananmen repressions go by unnoticed.102 The interruption of all high level contact as 
well as an arms trade embargo against China, represented some of the main measures set 
down by the Madrid European Council in order to condemn China’s unfair treatment of its 
citizens claiming their right to democracy. The fact that China claimed that 241 people had 
been killed in the days of June 1989, whereas NATO presented a number closer to 7 000 
casualties,103 illustrates the lack of information regarding human rights practices in China and 
complicates the EU-China relationship’s human rights dialogue accordingly.  
 Despite its demands for respect for human rights, the 1989 declaration was vague.104 It 
showed a political will to point out what needed to be done, but the EPC’s lack of legally 
binding measures reduced EU foreign policy to declarations which remained at the mercy of 
each member state’s voluntary compliance.105 The present thesis’ analysis of the 2004-2005 
debate on the EU arms embargo shows how this politically but not legally binding nature of 
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the embargo also jeopardised its effectiveness.106 The constant duality of national and 
European foreign policy also complicates the analysis of the decisive factors in the arms 
embargo case, as it shows how the member state primacy might prevent the emergence of an 
independent EU foreign policy.    
3.3 The normalisation of relations: fifteen years of increasing cooperation  
Despite the 1989 declaration’s condemnations of China’s actions, the majority of its sanctions 
did not seem to be able to resist the pressures within the EU for increased trade with China.107 
Despite the rough start in 1989, the 1990’s turned out to be a decade of increasing EU-China 
trade and cooperation. The EU’s total trade with China in 1993 was 30 840 million ECU, 
equalling approximately 40 billion US dollars.108 Furthermore, there was a major increase in 
EU-China trade up to 60 billion and 220 billion US dollars in 2000 and 2005, respectively.109 
Pan Wei emphasises this growth and points to how this has made the EU increasingly more 
dependent upon trade with China.110 China’s increase from a 1% to a 6% share of the EU’s 
total foreign trade, in 1989 and 2009 respectively, also confirms this. It is also noteworthy that 
the US has fallen behind the EU in its total trade with China, and thus possibly suggesting an 
increased importance of the EU and China as the world’s most important trading powers.111 
Bilateral relations between China and the EU were re-established by the European 
Council, only 16 months after the Tiananmen-sanctions were imposed.112 Dent explains this 
by arguing that the EU’s main goal concerning China in the 1990’s was to move from 
containment to engagement,113 and Algieri confirms this by pointing to how German and 
Italian businesses interested in trade with China pushed for this normalisation process.114 This 
quick normalisation has therefore often been explained by the attraction of the growing 
                                                 
106
 Kristin Archick, R. F. Grimmett and Shirley Kan. (May 27, 2005). “European union's arms embargo on china: 
implications and options for US policy.” CRS Report for Congress.   
107
 Franco Algieri. (2002). ”EU economic relations with China: An institutional perspective.” The China 
Quarterly, 169, pp.67-77. 
108
 European Commission. (1994). Towards a New Asia strategy, COM(94) 314 final. Annex III, table 2. 
109
 Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Wai Mun Hong. (2009). ”EU-China relations: Economics still in command? ” EAI 
Background Brief no. 484. p. 2. 
110
 John Fox and François Godement (2009). ”A power audit of EU-China relations” ECFR Policy report. 
111
 Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Wai Mun Hong. (2009). ”EU-China relations: Economics still in command? ” EAI 
Background Brief no. 484. p. 3. 
112
 European Commission. (2010). EU-China Relations: Chronology. 
113
 Christopher Dent. (2005, July 22). ”China’s economic relationship with the EU” Speech held at the US – 
China Economic and Security Review Commission : ‘China’s Growing Global Influence: Objectives and 
Strategies.’ Washington DC, USA. 
114
 Franco Algieri. (2002). ”EU economic relations with China: An institutional perspective.” The China 
Quarterly, 169, pp.67-77. 
33 
 
Chinese market.115 The market-oriented EU wanted to re-establish the many contacts created 
with the Chinese during the 1980’s. In addition to these commercial objectives, the absence of 
substantial Taiwanese lobby groups in Europe, the limited amount of European military 
interest in South East Asia and the change in world dynamics after the end of the Cold War, 
also seemed to explain the relaxation of tensions.116 The abandonment of the 1989 sanctions, 
except for the remaining arms embargo, was followed by the release of the EU’s first policy 
paper on China in 1995; A long-term policy for China-Europe relations, which emphasised 
China’s increasingly important global role. This paper also explicitly pointed to the 
normalisation of EU-China relations as an important step towards increased bilateral trade and 
investment.117 Looking at the normalisation from the Chinese point of view, Ting Wai, on the 
one hand, points to how realists explain this by the fact that China wished to improve its 
relations with Europe in order to balance against the increasingly unilateral USA. On the other 
hand, he further emphasises how liberalists argue that the Chinese rapprochement to Europe 
in the 1990’s was mainly due to a desire of being integrated into the international 
community’s financial and political institutions.118  
These developments of the EU-China relationship occurred while Europe redefined 
itself as the global defender of both economic and foreign policy multilateralism.119 The EU 
had developed into a different foreign policy actor, at least in the name, from the one that it 
had been before the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with the 
Maastricht treaty in 1992. Despite the increased institutionalised character of this foreign 
policy arrangement, the continued predominance of member states in the CFSP made the 
coordination and formulation of EU common foreign policy difficult and put national 
positions up against each other. This possibility of member states undermining each others’ 
interests may be said to contribute to the lack of unity within the framework of the 
intergovernmental CFSP,120 and is further discussed in chapter five of the present thesis. 
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 As the EU-China relationship developed during the 1990’s and the early 2000’s, the 
EU initiated new dialogues with China to emphasise its increased attention to this particular 
region. The 1995 launch of an EU-China Human Rights Dialogue, the first Asia-European 
Meeting (ASEM) in 1996, and the launch of the top-level EU-China summit in 1998, 
demonstrate some of these new initiatives.121 The 1998 EU Commission Policy paper on 
China; Building a comprehensive partnership, emphasised the broader aspects of EU-China 
relations, with a particular focus on dialogue between governmental and non-governmental 
actors.122 This decade thus proved to be a period of increasing relations between the EU and 
China, even though the arms embargo remained the proof of unresolved political differences.  
3.4 The high point of EU-China relations and the road ahead  
The set of new initiatives which emerged during the 1990’s could be said to have led to the 
apogee of EU-China relations in the early 2000’s. 2003 saw the formalisation of this increased 
cooperation as the 2003 European Security Strategy called for a stronger strategic partnership 
between the EU and China,123 and as the EU and China both issued a policy paper on each 
other in October that same year. The EU’s Policy paper, A maturing partnership - shared 
interests and challenges in EU-China relations, pointed to the need for updating the EU’s 
China policy because of the increased EU-China interdependence.124 As China, also in 2003, 
published its first policy paper on the EU, some argued that this clearly indicated that China 
was ready to take a step away from dealing with EU member states separately and start 
working with the EU as a more equal and unitary partner.125 In its paper, China also 
emphasised the importance of maintaining good relations with the increasingly influential EU, 
and confirmed the assumed high point of relations by claiming that EU-China relations had 
never been better. These positive outlooks on EU-China relations in the 2003 policy papers 
could indeed suggest that the EU-China relationship had evolved substantially since the 
interruption of affairs in 1989. However, it is also possible to argue that this was merely a 
high point of diplomatic niceties and rhetorical formulations. 
 Several scholars also claim that the EU-China relationship and the EU-US relationship 
are correlated and that relations between the three parties have become a diplomatic 
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triangle.126 Ting Wai claims that there is a “US factor” in EU-China relations which affects 
the nature of the cooperation.127 This suggests that the deterioration of EU-US relations would 
lead to an improved EU-China relationship. Considering the build-up of transatlantic tensions 
before and during the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, one could argue that this could have 
contributed to the simultaneous improvements of EU-China relations. The US’ impact on the 
EU-China relationship and its special relationship with the UK are further explored in chapter 
five of the present thesis. 
 There are different explanations to why the debate on the lifting of the arms embargo 
came about in 2003-2004. It is evident that the explicit wording in China’s abovementioned 
policy paper on the EU and the Chinese Premier’s calls for a strategic partnership in early 
2004, both demanded a reconsideration of the arms embargo.128 Also, Brødsgaard and Lim, 
among others, claim that it was the 2003 high point of EU-China relations which made it 
possible for China to push for a complete normalisation of affairs by asking for more in return 
for their market access.129  
The EU-China relationship quickly developed from trade-oriented relations in the 
1980’s, via the political tensions over the 1989 Tiananmen repressions and finally, back to a 
rapid normalisation of affairs in the 1990’s, which consequently led to an increasingly close 
relationship. Despite the maintenance of the arms embargo and the abovementioned efforts to 
include political aspects, such as human rights compliance, into the newly established 
strategic partnership, it still seems that economic growth and trade interests remain the corner 
stone of EU-China relations. This priority of economic interests above human rights 
considerations also seemed to be the main reason for the initiation of the arms embargo 
debate. However, the fact that the embargo was not lifted, suggests that political 
considerations might have, nonetheless, been present in the EU-China relationship. These ups 
and downs of the EU-China relationship show both the immense potential of EU-China 
cooperation as well as how this relationship often is conditioned by whether the EU member 
states are able to act unanimously. This is a matter which is more thoroughly explored in the 
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following chapters’ analysis of whether Community actors or member states were the main 
foreign policy decision makers in the arms embargo case.  
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4.0 The institutional context of EU foreign policy 
Keukeleire and MacNaughtan point to the complex institutional structure of the EU and call 
the EU’s foreign policy system “single by name, dual by regime and multiple by nature.”130 
This regime duality is illustrated by the fact that foreign policy within the EU is divided 
between an intergovernmental CFSP regime and a Community foreign economic policy 
regime, which consequently leads to a differentiation of actors’ competences and influences. 
This differentiation becomes clear as the formal competences of intergovernmental 
institutions contrast the arguable marginalisation of Community institutions within the EU’s 
CFSP. The purpose of this chapter is thus to identify these different institutions and actors’ 
actions and assess their impact on the arms embargo debate. 
 Firstly, the chapter presents the institutional context of the arms embargo case. 
Secondly, the chapter looks at the Community actors’ competences, or lack thereof, in the 
CFSP and explores how they positioned themselves during the predominantly 
intergovernmental arms embargo discussions.131 Thirdly, it presents the formal CFSP 
competences of the EU’s intergovernmental institutions and considers the latter’s role in the 
arms embargo debate. 
4.1 The institutional context of the arms embargo  
The abovementioned plurality of foreign policy frameworks and competences within the EU 
makes it impossible to analyse the arms embargo case without having considered its proper 
EU foreign policy context. When the June 1989 Madrid European Council imposed a series of 
sanctions against China, it was within the framework of the European Political Cooperation 
(EPC).132 This joint statement did not, however, impose one collective EU arms embargo 
against China, as arms embargoes were still under member state jurisdiction.133 Consequently, 
the issued set of member state embargoes were never incorporated into the legal framework of 
the EU and the joint statement remained a non-legally binding agreement dependent upon 
each member state’s individual interpretation.134 These individual interpretations also allowed 
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a de facto continuation of arms trade with China, despite the existence of an arms embargo.135 
This emphasised the limited effects of EPC decisions, and Dinan agrees with this as he points 
to the European Council foreign policy declarations’ lack of status within community law as 
one of the main reasons for why there is no coherent EU foreign policy.136 He nonetheless 
admits that these declarations provide a certain point of reference for European foreign policy. 
Compared to the CFSP, the EPC was a looser coordination-mechanism of national 
foreign policies which only functioned when each member state considered it desirable.137 
Individual member states could also at any given moment withdraw from these merely 
politically binding declarations.138 The incoherence of the EPC is further emphasised by 
White as he argues that voting within the EPC was avoided, and that member states still 
pursued independent foreign policies.139 However, he also points to how the growing agenda 
and the increased interdependence in international relations gradually changed governments’ 
foreign policy behaviour up until the creation of the CFSP. Nuttall calls this emerging change 
in government behaviour a “coordination reflex,” which suggests a habit of conferring with 
other member states before defining its own foreign policy.140 This may also be argued to be 
the essential precondition for a functioning and coherent CFSP.  
Even though the CFSP framework in place during the arms embargo debate possessed 
greater legally binding capacities than the EPC,141 the debate itself was still marked by the 
principle of consensus. This was because of the fact that the member states had decided that 
any potential lifting of the arms embargo would happen under the unanimity rule, even though 
there was no legal framework obliging them to do so.142 Even though this might suggest a 
habit of cooperation, seeing as they did not opt for unilateral approaches to the case, one can 
also see how the member states were safeguarding the primacy of their own national interests 
through this unanimity rule 
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The abovementioned primacy of member states and the unanimity rule could suggest 
that a traditional analysis of the foreign policies of the member states could be enough to 
explain the arms embargo case. However, the fact that the member states had indeed decided 
to settle the arms embargo question within the framework of the European Council, would 
question the actual strength of an analysis which excluded this framework. An analysis based 
solely on member state foreign policies, would have led to a false illusion of the hegemony of 
completely independent member state foreign policies, as it would have excluded the possible 
impact of Community actors and institutions. 
4.2 The European Commission, the High Representative for the CFSP and the 
European Parliament: Community actors in want of CFSP influence? 
Smith emphasises how Community actors, such as the Commission, the High Representative 
and the European Parliament, may act as policy and norm entrepreneurs even though they 
have limited foreign policy competences.143 Kreutz also points to this as he argues that the 
complex and intertwined nature of the EU’s foreign policy framework might allow actors 
without such formal CFSP competences to influence the decisions according to their interests 
and abilities.144 This potential myriad of foreign policy influences within the EU consequently 
makes it essential to consider a wide range of actors, and not just the member state 
governments, in a case study of EU foreign policy.  
4.2.1 The European Commission 
The Commission’s foreign policy role has seen a gradual development. From being 
considered an unwanted factor of supranational influence within the EPC framework, the 
Commission gained full association and functioned as a link between the Directorates-General 
(DGs) and the EPC following the 1981 London report. Finally, it received a non-exclusive 
right to initiative within the CFSP in the TEU in 1992.145 Much of its increased foreign policy 
role, beyond the exclusive competences within the Union’s foreign economic policy, has been 
attributed to the growing interconnectedness of economic and political foreign policies.146 The 
increased overlap in these areas has also led to more turf battles between the Commission and 
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the Council on foreign policy issues.147 The establishment of a conditionality clause within 
EU trade agreements in 1995148 is just one of many examples of this overlap, where the 
intergovernmental political foreign policy and the Community-oriented economic measures 
are combined in order to address the challenges of an increasingly interdependent and 
globalised world. 
 The 1999-2004 Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, referred to these 
boundary problems within EU foreign policy as he addressed the European Parliament on the 
arms embargo issue on November 16th 2004.149 Stating that the CFSP was not an issue area in 
which the Commission could take the lead, he nonetheless emphasised that the Commission 
was concerned about how a potential lifting of the embargo might influence the overall EU-
China relationship. Patten further expressed the need for China to take concrete steps towards 
improving its human rights record, in order to convince the public opinion of the EU that the 
arms embargo could be lifted.150 He also stressed the importance of a revised EU Code of 
Conduct on Arms Export in order to prevent an increasing export of EU arms to China. 
During the arms embargo debate in the EU, the EU Code of Conduct’s criteria number two, 
three and four of the in total eight criteria, concerning human rights compliance, internal 
repression, and the regional security situation, respectively, were all pointed to by proponents 
of the lifting, as a safeguard against an increase in arms sales to China.151 The non-legally 
binding nature of the EU Code of Conduct, however, makes it as dependent on individual 
interpretations as the 1989 arms embargo and questions its actual impact. The Code of 
Conduct’s demands for the EU-wide circulation of national reports on arms exports could of 
course create a certain ”logic of appropriateness” amongst the member states, but the fact that 
each government is free to decide the amount of details to be included in these reports, limits 
the Code’s ability to create a transparent arms export system. 
Contrary to Commissioner Patten, the President of the Commission at the time, 
Romano Prodi, seemed to focus less on the human rights aspect as he, in October 2004, 
expressed his support for the lifting.152 Prodi had earlier that year in Beijing pointed to China 
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as one of the EU’s top foreign policy priorities.153 He also seemed to try to assure China that 
the Commission prioritised EU-China trade and investment, while it was mainly the European 
public that was concerned about the human rights aspects of the lifting.154 This shows how the 
human rights aspect of the EU-China relationship is abandoned in favour of economics and 
how it is framed as a demand coming purely from the European public opinion, rather than an 
element of EU conditionality.155 In addition to this active engagement in promoting stronger 
commercial ties between the EU and China, Prodi also pointed out to Chinese Premier Wen 
that the Commission did not have any real influence on the member state-dominated embargo 
discussions.156  
As Commission President, Prodi enjoyed good-will from the leaders of the member 
states much because of the fact that he himself had previously been attending summits with 
them as a well-respected Prime Minister of Italy.157 Rossant also points to how the Europeans’ 
mistrust and dissatisfaction with the preceding Santer Commission had heightened the 
expectations towards the new Prodi Commission.158 The grounds for these expectations can 
also be seen in Prodi’s declared intentions of reforming the Brussels bureaucracy at the start 
of his Presidency.159 One could thus argue that the personal background of Prodi and the 
hopes for how this Commission would be better than the last one, contributed to granting the 
Commission President a higher regard among Europeans and, consequently, a possibly 
increased influence of his foreign policy statements. 
 However, the lack of institutional consistency in the Prodi Commission, between the 
President and the Commissioner for External Relations, suggests that the Commission 
President had not laid out any common Commission position on the arms embargo case. 
Patten admits this inconsistency, but explains that Prodi’s extensive delegation of 
responsibilities led to an amicable college of Commissioners which was less prone to turf 
battles.160 This lack of extensive central direction would then help explain the institutional 
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inconsistency within the Commission. Commissioner Patten illustrated this as he was able to 
oppose the lifting of the embargo, despite the fact that the Commission President seemed to 
be generally in favour of it. Patten, having been the UK’s last Governor-General of British 
Hong Kong, was used to negotiating with China and continued his Hong Kong human rights 
advocacy also in the EU’s arms embargo debate.161 The fact that the British Commissioner, 
Patten, opposed the lifting, could also suggest that he might have been affected by national 
interests in the otherwise Community-oriented Commission, considering the UK’s general 
reluctance towards a lifting. And even though Patten officially based his opposition to the 
lifting on China’s lack of human rights compliance, he later also emphasised that the EU 
should always consult the US on EU-China matters.162 This transatlantic coordination reflex, 
within the mind of an EU level official, also illustrates how Patten might have been 
influenced by the foreign policy tradition of his home country.163 
 The change of Commission in November 2004 saw the arrival of Jose Manuel Barroso 
as Commission President. In February 2005, Barroso claimed that the EU was ready to go 
ahead with the lifting of the arms embargo despite strong US opposition.164 Later, in July 
2005, Barroso, however, seemed to be more concerned for the human rights situation in China 
as well as its link to the possible lifting of the arms embargo.165 Even though Barroso 
expressed the need for China to improve its human rights situation, he also seemed to point to 
the European Parliament and the European public opinion as the main reasons for why there 
was a human rights element within the lifting discussions.166 Nonetheless, this sign of an 
increased level of human rights-considerations in the Commission could perhaps be explained 
by China’s adoption of the Anti-Secession Law in March 2005. The controversy of this “one 
China”-policy law was that it explicitly allowed armed interventions against civilian 
secessionist movements in Taiwan.167  
Barroso, similar to Prodi, had the privilege of being a former Head of Government.168 
However, one could perhaps argue that his Government’s unpopularity with the Portuguese 
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people, due to extensive austerity measures, and his party’s massive defeat in the 2004 
European elections, might have had a negative effect on Barroso’s reputation.169 However, 
Magone argues that Barroso, in spite of being criticised as uncharismatic and too pragmatic, 
was the right man for the job as this Commission Presidency would predominantly focus on 
maintaining consensus on the already initiated enlargement process.170 This focus on 
compromise and consensus could perhaps also explain Barroso’s somewhat more balanced 
view on the arms embargo, which emphasised both trade and human rights. One could also 
wonder, counterfactually, how influential the individual behind the Commission Presidency 
was, and whether the Commission would have played a more pro-active role in the arms 
embargo case if the more controversial Chris Patten, as proposed, would instead have 
assumed the Commission Presidency in 2004.171 
The new Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, 
Benita Ferrero-Waldner, also, as Barroso and Prodi, “blamed” the demands for an 
improvement of the human rights situation in China on the European Parliament and the 
European public opinion.172 She stated that the arms embargo should be lifted in order to 
reflect the recent and substantial developments of the EU-China relationship.173 Ferrero-
Waldner nonetheless referred to how the adoption of the abovementioned Anti-Secession Law 
had complicated the EU’s work towards reaching a consensus on the arms embargo lifting.174  
 There seemed to be more institutional consistency within the Barroso I Commission, 
as Barroso and Ferrero-Waldner seemed to be on the same page, even though Barroso 
appeared to be somewhat more concerned with the human rights aspect. Apart from Patten’s 
abovementioned critical view of the possible lifting, the Commission as an institution seemed 
to favour a lifting. This support was largely based on the considerations for EU-China trade 
and for the strategic partnership with China, as human rights and conditionality policies 
remained in the background. This could perhaps be explained by the fact that the Commission 
had traditionally had an economic foreign policy role, sidelined by the CFSP, and often stuck 
in the middle between the latter and DG TRADE.175 This is in spite of the abovementioned 
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gradual overlap of economic and political foreign policies after the Cold War, which made it 
necessary to include Community instruments as a part of CFSP decisions.176 Also, even 
though the Commission’s role in CFSP has remained limited, its role as the EU member 
states’ representative in international trade negotiations, such as in the World Trade 
Organisation, emphasises the external importance of the Commission. The increasing overlap 
between economic and political foreign policy and the fact that international trade can rarely 
be isolated from its surroundings could also suggest that the Commission’s prominent 
economic role in international trade might have been more political than first assumed. 
Consequently, the Chinese emphasis on the importance of the lifting, the increasing EU trade 
with China, and the fact that the arms embargo case was mainly a question about whether to 
assume arms trade with China, would then also explain the Commission’s trade-based 
positions in the arms embargo debate. 
Another reason for why the Commission did not get more actively involved in the 
political aspects of the arms embargo case, could also be the fact that it was, at the time of the 
2004-2005 discussions, preoccupied with the many political, economic and institutional 
challenges of the ten-country enlargement of the EU. In a 2004 speech, Prodi emphasised this 
enlargement process, the functioning of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the work 
towards creating a constitution for Europe as the three main priorities for the EU in the 
following years.177 This challenging set of priorities consequently might have muted the EU’s 
response to the Chinese and Franco-German demands for a lifting, as the Commission might 
have considered the successful achievement of the enlargement more important than the arms 
embargo case. 
4.2.2 The High Representative for the CFSP 
The post of the High Representative for the CFSP was created by the Amsterdam Treaty in 
order to get a more tangible representative for the evolving foreign policies of the EU.178 
Depending on the mandate given from the Council and on the instruments at its disposal, the 
High Representative’s task was to assist the Presidency in CFSP issues.179  
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The High Representative, Javier Solana, expressed at first no comments on the arms 
embargo lifting, before he later announced that a revision of the embargo’s status was the 
right choice.180 In February 2004, he went further with his endorsement by claiming that the 
EU was indeed ready to follow through with this mainly symbolic and political gesture of 
lifting the embargo.181 Solana also showed a wish to be able to influence the 
intergovernmental CFSP, as he explicitly urged European leaders to lift the arms embargo 
against China, based on the claim that China had been making real progress on human rights 
and that the abovementioned EU Code of Conduct on Arms Export would hinder any 
increased arms sales to China.182 The High Representative furthermore pointed to how the 
arms embargo was an unfair arrangement as the EU-China relationship had developed 
substantially since the embargo was imposed in 1989.183 
 The High Representative’s advocacy for a lifting of the arms embargo might suggest 
that he, as well as the majority of the Commission, prioritised a steady and commercially 
beneficial relationship with a rising China, over concerns for human rights improvements. 
However, Solana also repeatedly justified the lifting by pointing to the changed human rights 
situation in China. But this argument remains somewhat unfounded as the opacity of the 
Chinese society makes it difficult to assess whether the human rights situation had indeed 
improved. It is perhaps difficult to place the High Representative within the FPA framework, 
as it does not represent a state but the CFSP and the EU as a Community actor, and as it has 
no formal competences besides the possibility of influencing the Presidency’s foreign policy 
initiatives.184 Also the fact that the European Council Presidency was up until the Lisbon 
Treaty a rotating member state Presidency, might have led to conflicts of interests between 
member states’ national priorities and the Community nature of the High Representative.185  
 In the case of the arms embargo, the High Representative seemed to opt for a sort of 
declaratory diplomacy through speech acts, in order to make his position known. Youngs 
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emphasises how Solana did in fact manage to influence EU foreign policies during his time as 
the High Representative, but that this influence was marked by the “more traditional style of 
diplomatic mediation and alliance-building (...),” rather than an activist interpretation of his 
Community role.186 Solana’s time as Secretary General of NATO, could thus suggest that he 
had been influenced by this organisation’s emphasis on state sovereignty and 
intergovernmentalism. His NATO legacy also contributed to credibility and a high political 
profile in his dealings with European capitals, Washington and other international 
organisations.187 This personal weight might also have increased the level of influence for an 
otherwise somewhat vague EU institution. Magone has also pointed to how the Atlanticist 
convictions of Commission President Barroso and the former NATO Secretary General, 
Solana, could have helped improve the EU-US relationship after the clear transatlantic drift 
during the 2003 Iraqi crisis.188 However, this did not happen in the arms embargo case, as 
they both advocated a lifting in spite of the strong US opposition.189 This might be explained 
by suggesting that their Atlanticist orientations were not as important as assumed or that their 
roles as Community actors made it more difficult to express their Atlanticist convictions if the 
EU majority was not on their side. 
4.2.3 The European Parliament 
Even though the participation of the directly elected European Parliament (EP) could perhaps 
have boosted the legitimacy of the CFSP, the EP’s foreign policy role remained limited.190 
The EP is only to be consulted and informed about CFSP issues, and even then, the Council 
Presidency decides to what degree this is to be done. As a way of increasing its influence in 
EU foreign affairs, the EP has initiated its own reports and resolutions on relevant matters in 
order to make its voice heard.191 During the 1980’s, the EP pressured the EU, and particularly 
the Commission, into including the abovementioned human rights clause in all trade 
agreements with third countries, and became thus increasingly known as an important norm 
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entrepreneur in the EU.192 The then Director of the Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs, Jan Egeland, also pointed to how the EP’s efforts as a norm entrepreneur have 
remained neglected, even though that it had called for human rights action at times when 
national governments and other EU institutions had remained silent.193 
 The EP’s human rights advocacy is also evident in the arms embargo debate. The 
European Parliament Resolution of December 18th, 2003 against the removal of the EU arms 
embargo clearly stated that China had to improve its human rights record before the EU could 
consider any lifting of the arms embargo. It also strongly urged the Council and the member 
states to keep the embargo.194 The EP’s two following resolutions on the Council’s Fifth and 
Sixth reports on the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, respectively, maintained the call 
upon the Council and member states to keep the embargo and emphasised the need to make 
the Code of Conduct on Arms Export legally binding for all member states.195 
 In addition to these parliamentary resolutions, the transcripts of several 2005 EP 
plenary sessions demonstrated the EP’s declaratory diplomacy and showed how the prospect 
of lifting the arms embargo against China was subject to much criticism in the EP.196 The EP 
debate on the March 2005 European Council Conclusions demonstrated how members of the 
European parliament (MEPs) from different member states and different party groups, the 
EPP, PES and ALDE,197 all expressed their opposition to the lifting.198 In this debate, the 
Dutch ALDE MEP Dirk Sterckx expressed his bafflement over how the Council continued to 
discuss a lifting of the embargo despite strong and almost unitary opposition in the directly 
elected EP.199 Furthermore, Italian PES MEP, Guido Sacconi, emphasised how there were 
still human rights repressions going on in China, and British ALDE MEP Graham Watson 
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claimed that Europe would be “humiliated abroad” if it continued to promote trade over 
human rights concerns.200 Several EP plenary debates throughout 2005 conveyed the same 
message: a wish to keep the arms embargo until the human rights situation in China had 
improved substantially.201 The Polish UEN202 MEP Marcin Libicki, also acknowledged the 
limited effect of the arms embargo, but emphasised nonetheless, its symbolic importance, 
embodying the EU’s moral beliefs.203 The volume and coherence of MEP statements seem to 
suggest that the EP was a more or less united human rights-oriented actor. Viewed through 
Moravcsik’s FPA lens, this may consequently suggest that the EP behaved as a societal group 
which tried to export its human rights preferences to the main foreign policy decision makers. 
The abovementioned Community actors’ different views on the arms embargo, 
however, emphasise the lack of a unified position among the Community actors of the EU in 
general. These different positions also reflect the abovementioned “uneasy mix” of 
commercial and human rights-oriented aspects of the EU-China relationship.204 This divide is 
illustrated by how the EP advocated a maintaining of the embargo based on human rights 
concerns, while the Commission and the High Representative generally favoured the lifting as 
a means of improving the EU-China trade-oriented relationship. Even though Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan claim that Community actors become increasingly important because of an 
issue overload for the national representatives,205 the preceding analysis of Community 
actors’ actions illustrates how these supranational actors were still predominantly excluded 
from formal CFSP decision making. In spite of the fact that they still had the possibility of 
influencing other more powerful actors’ decisions through rhetoric action and suggestions, it 
remains, nonetheless, necessary to look at the intergovernmental actors’ actions in order to be 
able to understand what happened and who decided the course of events in the arms embargo 
case. 
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4.3 The European Council and the Council of the European Union: EU actors 
between the national and the supranational 
Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace point to an on-going debate about the role and image of the 
Council, where some scholars characterise the Council as a national interest-oriented obstacle 
to “bright ideas from the Commission or the EP,” while others see it as a forum for 
negotiating the common good for the EU as a whole.206 This illustrates how 
intergovernmental institutions, such as the Council, may be caught in the dilemma of being 
governed by national representatives and at the same time serve as some of the main decision-
making bodies of the Union. 
4.3.1 The European Council 
The European Council was not legally embedded within the treaty framework until the Single 
European Act (SEA) of 1986. Being initiated as a place for overall political direction of the 
EU in 1974, the European Council still remains the main decision maker of the CFSP.207 The 
member states’ Heads of Government or State, often together with their respective Foreign 
Ministers, make up the European Council, together with the President of the Commission and 
the High Representative for the CFSP. White points to the abovementioned Community 
aspect of the European Council as he calls it the EU’s “clearing house,” where contentious 
issues, which have reached a dead end in the Council, are readdressed for a final negotiation 
process.208 Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, however emphasise the national aspect of the 
European Council, as they claim that even though this was to be a body of overall political 
direction, it is nonetheless dominated by national foreign policies and domestic interests.209 
They have, however, admitted that there is a certain consensus culture within the European 
Council, and that its major foreign policy decisions usually are the products of integrationalist 
objectives.210 As chapter five of the present thesis includes a more extensive analysis of the 
Presidency of the European Council, the following sections focuses on the European 
Council’s main decisions regarding the arms embargo debate 
 The first official mention of a possible lifting of the arms embargo is found in the 
Presidency Conclusions of December 2003, which expressed that “the European Council 
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invites the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) to re-examine the 
question of the embargo on the sale of arms to China.”211 While the same document also 
emphasised the importance of defining the Union’s human rights policy, there was no 
indication of whether the European Council placed itself on the human rights or economic-
oriented side of the lifting debate.212 The Conclusions following the June 2004 European 
Council restated the invitation to the Council to follow up on the arms embargo question, 
especially in regard to the possible impact on the EU-China relationship.213 In December that 
same year, the European Council also emphasised the need to revise the abovementioned EU 
Code of Conduct on Arms Export in order to prevent increased arms sales to ex-embargo 
countries, but it did nonetheless call for a resolution of the arms embargo debate within the 
next Presidency period.214 This explicit invitation to the next Presidency to finalise the arms 
embargo debate, could perhaps suggest that a consensus was within reach, but it could also 
have been a way for the current Presidency of showing China its devotion to the developing 
EU-China strategic partnership, without really having to resolve the case itself.  
The expected finalisation of the issue, however, is nowhere to be found in the 
Conclusions of the next Presidency.215 The June 2005 Conclusions marked the thirtieth 
anniversary of EU-China relations and stated the importance of the EU-China strategic 
partnership, but the lifting of the arms embargo was not even mentioned. The fact that the 
arms embargo was absent in the Conclusions of the British Presidency in December 2005 as 
well, suggests that the issue had slipped off the negotiation table despite the December 2004 
Conclusions’ rather firm belief in a prompt finalisation. The non-mention of the arms 
embargo in the 2005 Conclusions might also be explained by how the European Council 
might have wished to appear strong in order to hide the institution’s internal disagreements on 
the contentious issue. This wish to appear united also explains why the Conclusions of the 
European Council in general do not reveal any internal divisions, but instead present a 
commonly reached consensus, conveyed by the Presidency. There is no indication of each 
member state’s position on different issues, and the European Council thus appears to be a 
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college rather than a place for complex intergovernmental bargaining. The European 
Council’s silence thus emphasises the need to look at individual member state positions in 
order to see what was going on underneath the surface. This could also suggest that a 
socialisation effect could be present within this institution, which is usually considered the 
epicentre of intergovernmentalism and member state interest representation. 
4.3.2 The Council of the European Union 
The Council, together with the European Council, is regarded as the main political and legal 
decision-making body of the CFSP.216 It is to ensure that the CFSP remains controlled by the 
member states, while it also, through its numerous compositions and frequent meetings, 
promotes policy coordination and cooperation between the member states. Up until the 
implementation of the Lisbon treaty in 2009, the GAERC was in charge of foreign trade, 
international agreements, the CFSP and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).217 
This institution is, as previously mentioned, located somewhat in between the national and 
supranational logic of the EU. This is demonstrated by how it is governed by the interests and 
priorities of national ministers, while it is an EU policy maker, whose substructures become 
increasingly important and possibly communitarized. The fact that there is no one Council, 
but a myriad of different Council configurations of national ministers, also makes it difficult 
to say that it predominantly works for a common EU interest.218 
As previously mentioned, the task of reviewing the arms embargo was delegated by 
the European Council to the Council in December 2003.219 Furthermore, the first Council 
discussions on the issue took place in the External Relations Council on January 26th 2004.220 
At this Council meeting, which also covered development policy, the possibilities of peace in 
the Middle East, a declaration on cooperation with the Western Balkans and relations with 
Russia, the arms embargo against China seemed to be only one of the many time consuming 
points on the busy agenda.221 The extensive agenda of the April 26th 2004 External Relations 
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Council also confirms Keukeleire and MacNaughtan’s argument about how the increased 
work load led to the fact that the exchange of views in the Council became a formality, rather 
than a time of genuine debate.222  
With the abovementioned agenda overload in the Council, an increasing amount of 
issues were being transferred to the Committee of the Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER) for preliminary negotiations before the regular Council meetings.223 
Consequently, a series of issues were being decided by national permanent representatives in 
COREPER or in the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The fact that nationally 
appointed experts in the Council’s working groups have been increasingly involved in the 
decision making process also confirms the diversity and multi-level nature of the Council and 
of the EU. This transfer of issues to a lower level is demonstrated by the External Relations 
Councils of January 26th and April 26th 2004, which acknowledged the invitation to examine 
the arms embargo question, but referred it directly to COREPER and the PSC for further 
deliberations, without stating its position on the matter.224 However, there was also a work 
overload in COREPER, as the preparation for the annual EU-China summit, including the 
deliberations on a proposed statement on the status of the arms embargo, was listed as one of 
the sixty-four points on the agenda for the 2075th COREPER meeting on December 1st 
2004.225 This could suggest that the lack of sufficient deliberation time on the arms embargo 
issue in the Council’s many fora could be one of the reasons why there was no finalisation of 
the question. The little amount of time granted to the discussions of the embargo thus 
indicates that the arms embargo case was perhaps not one of the Council’s top priorities. Also, 
as discussed in chapter five of the present thesis, one could argue that this lack of time was a 
result of the Presidencies’ agenda setting where the member states in office were reluctant 
towards making the embargo lifting one their top Presidency priorities.  
On the one hand, the fact that the EU Presidency’s agenda seemed to be affected by 
national interests would then show how traditional liberal FPA may be a useful theoretical 
framework for the analysis of EU foreign policy. On the other hand, the complex mix of 
intergovernmental and supranational institutions might make the application of traditional 
FPA to EU foreign policy more difficult. Smith agrees with this by pointing to how the co-
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existence of multiple actors and regimes makes the EU a sui generis actor.226 The non-
governmental nature of Community institutions also complicates things for the state-centred 
FPA, as there are claims that the EU foreign policy system challenges the notion of traditional 
state sovereignty.227 Despite these arguments about the EU being too sui generis for a 
traditional FPA, the unanimity rule and the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP, point to 
how such a state-centred analysis may, nonetheless, be possible, as the member states seem to 
remain the main decision makers in EU foreign policy.  
Sjursen confirms this primacy of member states in CFSP, as she argues that even 
though the EU’s foreign policy system has become a complex network of different 
intergovernmental and supranational actors, it is still naive to think that member states will 
lose their influence in EU foreign policy.228 Also, the fact that the majority of the Council’s 
deliberations on the lifting of the arms embargo, seems to have taken place during lunch 
meetings of the External Relations Councils,229 might suggest that there were in fact diverging 
member state positions on the issue which need to be further explored. This assumption is 
founded on the claim by Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, which points to how lunch meetings, 
as opposed to regular Council sessions, are considered a more suitable and confidential arena 
for the treatment of contentious and diverging issues.230 Consequently, this emphasises the 
need to consider how the different member states, and the domestic sources of their positions, 
affected the arms embargo case. The abovementioned intergovernmentalism of the CFSP and 
the indications that internal divergence within the Council might have affected the outcome of 
the arms embargo debate, thus explain why the next chapter considers the member states and 
domestic actors’ actions. 
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5.0 EU member states and EU foreign policy 
White claims that “we cannot understand European foreign policy-making without looking at 
the separate foreign policies of member states.”231 This is also the case with the analysis of 
arms embargo discussions. The abovementioned primacy of intergovernmentalism in the 
CFSP and the fact that the embargo was to be settled by unanimity in the European Council, 
both call for a more in-depth assessment of the member states’ actions and positions in order 
to provide a more comprehensive analysis.  
 The chapter firstly focuses on how domestic factors, such as national parliaments, 
business interests and special bilateral relationships, possibly shaped the arms embargo 
positions of EU member states. Secondly, it looks at how the rotating Presidency of the 
European Council might have been a potential source of national interest projection. 
5.1 Member states and domestic sources of EU foreign policy 
The multitude of EU member states creates a vast amount of domestic actors, structures and 
procedures to be accounted for in a nationally oriented analysis.232 That is why, as explained 
in chapter one of the present thesis, this analysis is focused on four member states, the UK, 
France, Germany and Sweden, in order to try to provide a more in-depth analysis and to avoid 
a perhaps less analytical listing of all the then twenty-five member states’ actions. 
The following comparative layout, structured around actors rather than member states, 
has been chosen in order to emphasise how national and domestic actors’ positions seem to 
reflect that type of actor’s typical positions, instead of their national affiliation. 
5.1.1 The Governments 
The intergovernmentalist nature of the CFSP gives the Governments a key role in deciding 
and formulating the EU’s political foreign policy. This also emphasises the Heads of 
Government or State’s prominent position in articulating and perhaps protecting national 
foreign policy interests on the EU arena.  The member states’ Ministries of Foreign Affairs 
therefore see a certain decline of their traditional foreign policy power because of how the 
Prime Ministers233  become the “gate keepers” of national foreign policy, as EU foreign policy 
coordination increases. Tonra agrees with this as he argues that the increased complexity and 
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pace of the EU system has created an opportunity for the Prime Minister to become more 
involved in foreign policy.234 This centralisation of national foreign policy positions also 
illustrates how the Prime Ministers want to assure that the government speaks with one voice 
in Brussels.235 In spite of the possible co-existence of many and perhaps opposing domestic 
actors, this ”primeministerialisation” emphasises thus how statements made by the Prime 
Ministers may arguably be a sufficient basis for the analysis of member states’ actions.236 
 The German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder and the French President, Jacques Chirac, 
were the first to explicitly call for a lifting of the arms embargo within the EU. On a state visit 
to China in December 2003, Schröder claimed that it was time for the EU embargo to be 
lifted.237 Chirac joined in during Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to France in 2004 as he 
argued that the embargo was anachronistic.238 Schröder also promised China to push for an 
end to the embargo from the inside, as a way of promoting commercial ties between Germany 
and China.239 Economist Wolfe explained these lifting initiatives by pointing to Franco-
German hopes of commercial good-will and increased trade with China after their 1990’s 
economic slump.240 This suggests that economic benefits of the lifting seemed to upstage the 
human rights concerns which had initially led to the imposing of the embargo.241 The Franco-
German initiative was also evidence of a wish to Europeanize a national question in order to 
get the most effect out of it.242 This Europeanization would then imply that France and 
Germany projected their national interests, of upgrading their respective relationships with 
China, into an EU context via the arms embargo case.  
While the French Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin, also opposed the embargo 
because of China’s new role as an important strategic partner,243 the German foreign minister, 
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Joshka Fischer of Schröder’s Government coalition party, the Greens, was more critical to a 
lifting without a more substantial update of the abovementioned EU Code of Conduct.244 The 
Greens’ environmental and human rights-oriented policies were thus evident in the Foreign 
Minister’ position. This also points to the perhaps inevitable political differences which exist 
within a coalition government on certain issues. 
 The UK Labour Government announced in the UK House of Lords in January 2004 
that it gladly welcomed a review of the arms embargo.245 Baroness Symons, the UK Minister 
of State for the Middle East, International Security, Consular and Personal Affairs in the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, emphasised the fact that the UK had already shown its 
arms control engagement by initiating the abovementioned EU Code of Conduct on Arms 
Exports in 1998.246 She also claimed that this Code was a much better instrument for arms 
regulations than vaguely defined embargoes.  
Even though the UK position on the subject initially seemed rather vague and 
undecided, Prime Minister Tony Blair eventually supported Chirac and Schröder’s lifting bid 
in June 2004.247 However, the UK’s special relationship with the US complicated the UK’s 
position in the arms embargo case, as the US was clearly opposed to the lifting.248 The 
Chinese repressions of the Tiananmen Square protests had also led to an American arms 
embargo against China. This embargo was perhaps additionally motivated by the fear of an 
increasingly militarised China next to its Taiwanese allies,249 and the US strongly advocated 
the mutually reinforcing effect of these two embargoes as it pressed for a continuation of the 
EU’s embargo during the 2004-2005 debate.250 The US’ security interests and military 
presence in South East Asia also strengthened its aversion towards EU member states’ 
possibilities of exporting an increased amount of advanced defence technology, which they 
had in turn acquired from the US, to China. As the present chapter’s section on the Presidency 
of the European Council later demonstrates, the US’ influence on the 2005 UK Presidency’s 
agenda proved to be one of the main reasons for why the lifting did not happen. The UK 
                                                 
244
 Joakim Kreutz. (2004). “Reviewing the EU Arms Embargo on China: the clash between value and rationale 
in European Security Strategy.” The Central European review of international affairs, 22, pp. 43-58. 
245
 Baroness Elizabeth Symons. (2004, January 12). UK Parliament House of Lords, Column 373China: EU 
Arms Trade Embargo. 
246
 Ibid. 
247
 Richard A. Bitzinger. (2004, December 31). ” A Prisoner's Dilemma: The EU's China Arms Embargo” 
[Electronic version].  China Brief. 
248
 Stephen Fidler and D. Dombey. (2005, January 20). ”Top US official rejects Straw’s attempt to ease tension 
over China arms embargo” [Electronic version]. Financial times. 
249
 Ibid. 
250
 Gudrun Wacker. (February 17, 2005). Lifting the EU arms embargo against CN. US and EU position. 
Working paper presented at the 1st colloquium of the TFPD-Working group “China’s Rise.” Washington DC, 
USA. 
58 
 
Government thus seemed to owe much of its hesitation in the arms embargo discussions to its 
powerful partner’s strong opposition to the lifting and to the many beneficial links between 
British and American defence industries.251 
 Sweden was early on reluctant towards a lifting of the arms embargo.252 The public’s 
human rights advocacy and interest in foreign policy questions put Sweden in an awkward 
position as the EU looked for a consensus on the arms embargo issue.253 Swedish Social 
Democratic Prime Minister, Göran Persson, nonetheless, showed his support for the lifting by 
calling for a more constructive dialogue with China without the constraints of the arms 
embargo.254 Persson, however, similar to Baroness Symons, also emphasised the need for a 
revised and more effective EU Code of Conduct, but explicitly stated that he would not veto 
the EU’s lifting of this ineffective embargo.255 Laila Freivalds, the Swedish Foreign Minister, 
also favoured a lifting of the embargo as she assured human rights advocates that Swedish 
export rules would continue to prevent Swedish arms exports to China.256 She also argued that 
constructive engagement, instead of the continuation of the embargo, would be the best way 
of promoting democratic development in China.257  
The Swedish Government’s position did not seem to differ from other member states’ 
positions, even though its Nordic tradition of human rights advocacy would suggest a clear 
Swedish opposition to the lifting of a human rights-based embargo. Miles explains this by 
pointing to how Sweden considered active involvement in the CFSP as a way of consolidating 
its “EU credentials” and of showing the EU its devotion despite its neutrality.258 This desire to 
fit in is also emphasised by Casarini, as she argues that neither Sweden nor Denmark wanted 
to be the one to break the EU consensus, despite considerable opposition in their national 
parliaments.259 This could perhaps suggest that both Sweden and Denmark followed the 
previously mentioned coordination reflex, arguably inherent within an evolving CFSP system. 
Sweden’s move away from its traditional values in order to fit in, could perhaps also suggest 
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that a socialisation factor or the ”logic of appropriateness” of the CFSP had affected Sweden’s 
position. This socialisation effect, which Manners and Whitman point to as disproportionately 
linked with the size of each member state and its administration,260 would then have created a 
new and European sense of community and possibly affected the preference formation of 
Swedish government representatives. Even though the minority status of the Swedish 
Government made it perhaps necessary to consider the Parliament’s position, the European 
socialisation process had arguably created another group of constituents, in this case the 
Swedish Government’s counterparts in the EU, whose views also needed to be considered. 
This might be an example of Putnam’s previously mentioned “two-level game,” where 
national governments are simultaneously engaged both nationally and internationally during 
intergovernmental negotiations.261 
 While Sweden avoided vetoing the lifting possibly because of socialisation effects, 
Germany, France and the UK seemed to base their lifting advocacy on three recurring 
arguments against sanctions: the fear of possible implications on commercial interest, the 
view that it would be too risky to antagonise the sanctioned country and the doubts about the 
effect of the sanctions.262 German Chancellor Schröder’s emphasis on trade relations,263 the 
French foreign minister Villepin’s talk of China as a privileged partner,264 and the UK 
Government’s, and Sweden’s, focus on the EU Code of Conduct as a better functioning 
instrument for arms control,265 are indeed examples of how these different arguments against 
sanctions were employed by pro-lifting Governments. This clearly suggests that the lifting 
campaign was focused on the considerations for economic growth and trade, rather than on 
the human rights conditions in the sanctioned country. As previously mentioned, the tension 
between economic and political considerations thus becomes evident in the EU’s relationship 
with emerging world powers, such as China. 
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5.1.2 National parliaments and public opinion: subdued domestic opposition? 
Even though the Heads of Government or State seemed to control the formulation of national 
foreign policies, it is also necessary to consider how the national parliaments positioned 
themselves vis-à-vis their respective Governments’ stance on the arms embargo. Despite the 
executive nature of foreign policies, it can be argued that the domestic political climate will in 
some way or another always influence how governments behave internationally. Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace acknowledge this by pointing to the fact that there is much more to 
member state positions than their Governments.266 The extent to which the domestic political 
climate is able to influence its government’s positions is, however, dependent on the 
government’s support and standing within its country. 
As the Council is not directly accountable to national parliaments, the task of 
informing and including parliamentarians in foreign policy decision-making remains that of 
each government in the respective member state.267 Manners and Whitman furthermore 
emphasise the individual governments’ different views on this, as they point to how 
parliamentary scrutiny is an important factor in shaping the foreign policy of some member 
states, such as Sweden and Denmark, while other member states, with more centralised 
foreign policy frameworks, such as France and the UK, consider parliamentary oversight 
largely ineffective and redundant.268 The impact of national parliaments is thus expected to 
vary according to the wishes and practices of national governments. 
 According to Blunden, French leaders have taken it for granted that foreign policy is 
the President’s prerogative and that “the building of Europe never should be a democratic or 
popular process.”269 Consequently, French foreign policy-making remains a concentrated 
process where the President, in close “symbiosis” with the Quai d’Orsay, is the principal 
foreign policy actor. This is illustrated by the fact that Chirac strongly advocated the lifting of 
the arms embargo, while there was considerable opposition in the Assemblée Nationale. The 
opposition was evident as half of the 577 representatives in the French Parliament, and 
amongst them representatives from Chirac’s own party,270 boycotted Chinese President Hu’s 
parliamentary address in January 2004, and instead joined the demonstrations outside the 
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Parliament buildings.271 French parliamentary debates also demonstrated disagreements both 
amongst the French MPs and between the President and the Parliament concerning the human 
rights aspect of the embargo lifting.272 
 The German Bundestag demonstrated their opposition to the lifting, as German MPs, 
including the majority of Schröder’s Social Democratic party, as well his coalition party, the 
Greens, passed a resolution in late 2003 in favour of keeping the embargo.273 The fact that 
Schröder continued to advocate a lifting in spite of a clear bipartisan parliamentary majority, 
suggests that the Bundestag had limited influence on German foreign policy. Chancellor 
Schröder further emphasised the Government’s primacy in foreign policy questions, as he 
claimed that “the constitution states that foreign policy is conducted by the federal 
Government. I take every vote in the Parliament seriously, but the constitutional position is 
clear.”274 The abovementioned connection between the government and the domestic political 
climate in foreign policy making thus seemed to be broken by the explicit centralisation of 
foreign policy. 
 The British Houses of Parliament have not traditionally been a key player in the UK’s 
foreign policy-making process.275 Foreign policy in the UK is a government prerogative and 
has also been increasingly concentrated within the Prime Minister’s Office.276 Prime Minister 
Tony Blair’s increased personal involvement in foreign affairs, through international summits 
and informal foreign policy networks, allowed the Prime Minister’s Office to extend its 
foreign policy competence and thus remain the “gate keeper” of UK foreign policy.277 This 
centralisation of foreign policy has thus given the UK Parliament limited input into the 
foreign policy making process.278 In addition to limited parliamentary input, White also 
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claims that the British centralisation of foreign policy around the Prime Minister has increased 
public ignorance in Britain about the EU’s impact on UK foreign policy.279 
 The UK Parliament Select Committee on Defence pointed to continued human rights 
violations in China as it stated, in its fourth report in 2004, that the EU arms embargo should 
not be lifted.280 This report also called for increased clarity about the identity of buyer 
countries in the UK Government’s annual reports on arms export. Despite Baroness Symons’ 
claim than the EU Code of Conduct would be a more efficient arms control instrument that 
the arms embargo, several MPs from the Conservative Party continued to question the 
lifting.281 British Tory MP Mark Simmonds pointed to possible negative impacts of the lifting 
on the UK’s defence industry and on British trade with the US.282 He also expressed concerns 
about its impact on the UK’s relations with the rest of South East Asia.283 Another 
Conservative MP, Michael Ancram, proposed a unilateral British continuation of the embargo 
in case of an EU lifting, but was confronted by Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, who pointed to 
the limited effects of unilateral arms embargoes.284 
 The majority of MPs criticising the UK Government’s position in the arms embargo 
case seemed, however, to be members of the opposition, the Conservative Party. This might 
confirm Forster’s argument that the British system of parliamentary whips guarantees that the 
governing party’s MPs will support the Government’s foreign policy positions.285 This system 
might thus prevent the same kind of bipartisan parliamentary opposition as was found in the 
German and French Parliaments. However, there were also Labour signatories of the April 
2004 UK Parliament’s Early Day Motion against the lifting of the arms embargo, but the fact 
that only 63 of a total of 659 British MPs signed this Motion may suggest that the British 
parliamentary opposition to the lifting was in fact quite limited, and that a large part of the 
abovementioned protests might have been mainly motivated by opposition party politics.286 
 The long periods of stable minority Social Democratic Governments in Sweden after 
the Cold War,287 have increasingly led to Sweden being regarded as having one of the more 
open state structures, where parliamentary scrutiny might affect national foreign policy 
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making.288 The Governments’ minority position, a more assertive Parliament and a general 
scepticism towards European integration, have consequently led to a political climate where 
the Swedish Government increasingly seeks to accommodate the Parliament.289 However, 
while foreign policy formation in Sweden also, ultimately, remains in the hands of the Prime 
Minister, the Government’s increased willingness to consult the Riksdag, suggests that the 
Swedish system is more open to parliamentary input than its French, German or British 
counterparts. 
 At the time of the arms embargo debate, there was also strong human rights-based 
opposition in the Swedish Parliament against the Social Democratic minority Government’s 
support of the lifting. Left Party290 MP Alice Åström argued against the lifting by pointing to 
how China had never admitted the repressions of Tiananmen Square.291 She also criticised the 
Swedish Government’s lack of external consistency in its reactions to human rights violations 
in countries important to Swedish commercial interests.292 Cecilia Wigström of the Liberal 
Party also called for more conditionality in Sweden’s relations with China and for diminishing 
the gap between rhetoric and practice in the Government’s human rights policy.293 She also 
accused the EU and the Swedish Government of prioritising business over human rights in the 
arms embargo case, and suggested that Sweden should instead side with the US.294 
Furthermore, another Liberal Party MP, Carl B. Hamilton, argued that even though the 
embargo might not be as effective as expected, the lifting of it would send a political message 
to China suggesting that the EU and Sweden had forgotten about the 1989 Tiananmen 
repressions.295 This symbolic importance of maintaining the arms embargo as diplomatic 
leverage for human rights improvements in China was also pointed to by Metten.296 The fact 
that other parliaments, the British, German and French Parliaments and the EP,297 also 
mentioned this political symbolism of the lifting of the embargo, might suggest, that the 
position of the actor was more important than its nationality, when it came to preference 
                                                 
288
 Ian Manners and R. Whitman. (2000). “Conclusion,” in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.).The foreign 
policies of European Union member states. New York: Manchester University Press, Chapter 13, pp. 243-273. 
289
 Ibid. 
290
 The Swedish socialist party Vänster. Some of its main party policies are feminism, environment protection 
and opposition to nuclear power. 
291
 Alice Åström. (2004, December 18). Sveriges Riksdag. Riksdagens protokoll 2004/05:55. 
292
 Alice Åström. (2005, February 9). Sveriges Riksdag. Riksdagens protokoll 2004/05:72 
293
 Cecilia Wigström. (2005, February 9). Sveriges Riksdag. Riksdagens protokoll 2004/05:72. 
294
 Cecilia Wigström. (2005, March 12). ”Vi borde inte tiga när EU häver embargot mot Kina ” [Electronic 
version]. Dagens Industri,   
295
 Carl B. Hamilton. (2005, April 5). Sveriges Riksdag. Riksdagens protokoll 2004/05:98 
296
 Vincent Metten. (February 25, 2011). ”Should the EU lift the arms embargo on China?” Euractiv. 
297
 Marcin Libicki. (2005, April 27). European Parliament plenary debate: Human rights in the world 2004 and 
the EU's policy, 
64 
 
formation. Consequently, this might suggest that there is a link between the positions of 
parliaments of different levels, as these legislatures’ “outsider”-position in foreign policy 
making might make it easier and less costly for them to promote human rights over business 
relations.298  
Just as in the UK, the opposition in the Swedish Parliament against the lifting also 
seemed mainly to come from the non-governing parties: the Liberal party and the Christian 
Democrats, but also from the minority Social Democratic Government’s two supporting 
parties, the Green party and the Left party. This could suggest that the parliamentary 
discipline in Sweden on foreign policy resembles the one in the UK Parliament, unlike the 
French and German parliamentary systems. The fact that the Left Party and the Greens were 
only supporting parties and not actually in office, would exclude their MPs from the 
governing party’s parliamentary discipline. One might perhaps argue that this parliamentary 
discipline in the Swedish Riksdag facilitated parliamentary scrutiny, as the Government 
expected the support from at least its own MPs. Also the minority position of the Government 
made parliamentary consultation less avoidable.  
Despite broad European parliamentary opposition, the governments seemed to carry 
on with their work towards the lifting. This sometimes clear divide in foreign policy between 
the governments and the directly elected MPs, could suggest a limited impact of public 
opinion on foreign policy. However, it is also important to consider that the members of the 
governments deciding these foreign policies were, in many cases, also directly elected 
members of the national legislature and thus representing the people. Also, the Social 
Democratic MPs in Sweden and the Labour MPs in the UK House of Commons were all 
publicly elected, but did, nonetheless, generally seem to agree with the Governments’ 
position. Another point is that the centralisation of foreign policy around the President in 
France cannot really be said to have isolated the public’s opinion, seeing that the French 
President was directly elected by the people. Hill therefore points to how the public’s limited 
impact can mainly be explained by the lack of public involvement and interest in national 
foreign policy, and not by a deliberate government marginalisation of the public.299   
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In the arms embargo case, however, the human rights aspect of the issue seemed to 
engage the public and lead to a general opposition to their governments’ lifting advocacy.300 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as Amnesty International, Saferworld and the 
British Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT), also expressed their human rights based 
opposition to the lifting. Robert Parker of Amnesty International and Roy Isbiter of 
Saferworld clearly stated, in the UK Parliament, that the embargo should instead be 
strengthened and serve as a human rights bench mark.301 CAAT repeatedly urged the UK 
Government to sever its close links with the defence companies302 and CAAT’s Ann Feltham 
also fervently advocated that the arms embargo should be maintained because of the 
embargo’s political symbolism.303 
The different national parliaments and the publics’ opposition, in states where the 
governments clearly advocated a lifting of the embargo, could then again suggest that the 
actors’ roles influenced their preference formation more than their nationality. The 
abovementioned socialisation effect might have affected the Governments’ positions as they 
had to consider the “two-level game,”304 while negotiating a consensus within the European 
Council. The national parliaments and the national public opinion, however, would be less 
constrained by this socialisation effect as they would not have to take part in the actual 
negotiation process. Kreutz points to this phenomenon by explaining how it is necessary to 
consider the actor’s role in the policy making process in order to analyse its actions.305 As 
previously discussed, he further emphasises how those “outside,” in opposition, often opt for 
another stance than those “inside,” in power. One might thus argue that the fact that the 
national parliaments enjoy little formal competences in national foreign policy making puts 
them in an “outsider” position. Consequently, this “outsider” position might have made it 
easier for them to stick with their human rights-based argumentation as they would not have 
to consider the possible negative Chinese reactions to this contentious aspect of EU-China 
relations.  
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5.1.3 Business interests and foreign policy 
There is an ongoing debate about the impact of non-governmental actors on national foreign 
policy making. While realists emphasise the continued primacy of the state, the evolving 
international environment of an increasingly globalised world might suggest that state actors 
may no longer claim to be the exclusive foreign policy actors. The growing interdependence 
shows how transnational companies and organisations form new types of networks outside 
existing state structures, and makes it necessary to include a wider range of actors within the 
study of foreign policies. The proliferation of foreign policies has thus not just opened up the 
process to other national players, but also to non-governmental actors, such as multi-national 
companies and trade unions.306 This proliferation thus contributes to the increasingly complex 
analysis of a state’s foreign policy formation. A number of scholars acknowledge the possible 
impact of transnational and non-governmental actors. Manners and Whitman are among those 
who argue that non-governmental interests can no longer be ignored,307 and Strange 
emphasises the impact of business interests, by announcing the “retreat of the State” where 
the markets take control over their former masters, the governments.308 This intertwined 
nature of diplomatic and trade relations is also illustrated by the increasingly popular practice 
of having an entourage of important business leaders accompany the Heads of State or 
Government on their state visits.309 
 In the case of the arms embargo, Kogan argues that the close links between arms 
export and the defence industry allow the national defence companies to pressure their 
respective governments into leading a foreign policy in favour of the defence industry’s 
interests.310 He further emphasises how the overall decrease in European defence budgets has 
shifted arms exporters’ focus onto China and its rapidly growing defence market. French and 
German government representatives have pointed to how it is impossible to ignore the 
potential of this newly opened arms market.311 Cabestan refers to this growing link between 
governments and different business interests as he argues that while France was pressured by 
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defence industry giants such as the French Thales and the Franco-German-Spanish EADS312 
to resume sales to China, Germany was mainly under pressure from German civilian industry, 
which hoped that a lifting would lead to commercial good-will from China.313 This shows 
how the symbolic value of the lifting of the last Tiananmen sanction could be as important to 
the improvements of EU-China relations as the actual lifting of the embargo. Consequently, 
Kogan argues that it is indeed the commercial enterprises that would gain the most if the 
embargo was lifted.314 This can be explained by the expected post-embargo good-will from 
China, who had been pushing for the lifting as a way of restoring its international status, and 
by considering the maintenance of European and national export restrictions.315 
 The fact that leading European defence companies described China as “just another 
market,” demonstrated their support for the lifting and suggested that they might have tried to 
influence their respective governments’ positions.316 The Anglo-Italian Finmeccanica and the 
Swedish Ericsson were among those opposing the embargo.317 This was also the case with 
Philippe Camus, the CEO of EADS, who claimed that the embargo was a “remnant of the 
Cold War.”318 The French defence company Dassault explicitly showed its interest in the 
growing Chinese defence market as it concluded a deal with China in 2005, worth 12 billion 
Euros, in anticipation of the lifting of the embargo.319 This also demonstrates the non-legally 
binding character of the 1989 arms embargo and of the 1998 EU Code of Conduct.320 From 55 
million Euros in 1990, the EU member states’ arms exports to China had increased to a 
soaring 400 million Euros in 2004.321 While this might have been even higher if there was no 
arms embargo, it is clear that the embargo had not been as effective as opponents of the lifting 
might have argued.  
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Even though it seems like defence companies were generally in favour of lifting the 
embargo, some companies appeared to be more reluctant. Journalist Rana Forhoonar claimed 
that important technology transfers between US and European defence companies and the 
importance of contracts on the US defence market, led European defence companies to 
choose the US’ side in the arms embargo debate.322 As previously mentioned, the US was 
strongly against the EU abandoning its embargo against China, and pointed to the human 
rights violations in China and to the risk of militarily destabilising South-East Asia as reasons 
for keeping the embargo.323 The US House of Representatives’ February 1st 2005 Resolution 
on the possible lifting of the EU’s embargo called upon the EU to “reconsider this unwise 
action,” and pointed to how such a lifting would be in direct conflict with US security 
interests and to how it might limit transatlantic technology transfers.324  
The US’ clear opposition to the lifting and the threats of interrupting transatlantic 
defence industry cooperation might thus explain why Mike Turner, CEO of the British 
defence company BAE Systems, ruled out arms sales to China in an effort to “do nothing to 
jeopardize our position with the US.”325 Swedish MP, Carl B. Hamilton also expressed his 
fear of US repercussions towards the largely British-owned Swedish defence industries in 
case of a lifting.326 The previously pro-lifting EADS and French Dassault seemed moved 
away from their initial position, as they stated that sales to China were not on their agenda.327 
One explanation for EADS’ and Dassault’s possible change of mind could be the fact that the 
US threats of interruptions of technology transfers across the Atlantic might have become 
more imminent as the US formalised its opposition in the 2005 House Resolution.328 
 The close connection between defence companies and the government administration 
in the UK might serve as an example of how integrated business interests might be within 
governmental structures. The Defence Export Services Organisation (DESO)329 within the UK 
Ministry of Defence (MoD), established direct links between the UK Trade Department and 
the defence companies and provided UK defence companies with export assistance in order to 
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promote and increase their overseas trade.330 These explicit links were again emphasised with 
the so-called “revolving door” practice, where MoD and defence company employees 
exchanged jobs and thus became socialised into a sense of community with both 
governmental and non-governmental colleagues.331 This socialisation process would then also 
perhaps increase the defence companies’ influence in UK foreign policy as personal 
relationships strengthened official links. The fact that the main British defence company, BAE 
Systems, clearly opposed any lifting that would damage its links with the US, might then help 
explain why the UK Government eventually seemed to join the BAE Systems in their US-
influenced opposition towards the lifting.332 
The formal links between the UK MoD and the defence companies provided explicit 
channels for the business interests’ impact on government policies. In Germany, France and 
Sweden, the links are perhaps not as formalised as in the UK, but the defence companies 
might still have a considerable impact on the Governments’ positions. As previously 
mentioned, the German Government’s emphasis was mainly on improving commercial trade 
ties with China and this might be a result of commercial businesses’ influence on German 
foreign policy. The French and German Governments’ emphasis on the importance of gaining 
access to the Chinese market demonstrates how diplomatic and trade relations become 
intertwined.333 Also, the fact that Chirac’s state visit to China in 2005 finalised French 
companies’ contracts with China, worth four billion US dollars, clearly suggests that there 
might be a link between business interests and government policies.334 
The Swedish defence companies’ close ties with the UK defence industry would 
suggest that they were as concerned as the BAE Systems for potential repercussions from the 
US. This fear was addressed by MP Carl Hamilton in the Swedish Riksdag.335 The Swedish 
Foreign Minister, Laila Freivalds, did not reject his concerns, but focused on how a close 
dialogue with the US would be the way to approach the problem.336 The fact that this was 
indeed accounted for, also suggests that the Swedish defence industry’s interests had an 
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impact on the formation of the Swedish position. The importance of trade relations in all of 
these four countries might suggest that the commercial interests might have succeeded in 
getting their voice heard. This influence is, however, difficult to assess, as it is rarely 
identified by government officials, and as it is possible that governmental policies promoting 
business relations would have existed even without the business interests’ advocacy. 
If the BAE Systems and other defence companies did indeed manage to influence the 
governments’ position, it would be necessary to consider who the government really 
represented. Did they become commercial agents of the defence companies’ subset of society 
or were they representing the society in a more general manner? These questions point to 
Moravcsik’s liberal FPA’s notion of the governments’ representative role in foreign policy, and 
could demonstrate traditional domestically oriented FPA’s ability to explain aspects of 
European foreign policy.337 This is further discussed in chapter six in the assessment of 
traditional FPA’s applicability to an evolving EU foreign policy. 
5.1.4 The impact of member states’ special bilateral relationships 
In addition to parliamentary scrutiny and business interests, special bilateral relationships 
create an external factor in the formation of member states’ foreign policies. States cannot be 
seen as isolated islands and it is therefore also necessary to look beyond state borders in order 
to identify the sources of national foreign policies. Moravcsik includes an element of this in 
his liberal actor-centred FPA approach, where interdependence causes one state’s preferences 
to pose constraints on the room to manoeuvre and the preferences of another given state.338 
Manners and Whitman also look at external sources of foreign policies as they focus on how 
EU member states’ bilateral relationships and special interests might “ring-fence” their 
foreign policies and thus affect their behaviour in the EU.339 These special relationships might 
thus become additional steering mechanisms of member states’ foreign policies.340 
 The UK’s special relationship with the US is perhaps the most evident of these 
relationships. The three concentric circles of British foreign policy, presented by Winston 
Churchill in 1948, the American, the European and the one regarding the Commonwealth, had 
for a long time been the basis for the UK’s foreign policy priorities, before the decline of the 
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Commonwealth left Britain with two main circles.341 Young points to how these three circles 
served as a “biblical text for the justification of strategic indecision” of British foreign 
policy.342 This “strategic indecision” is thus evident in the UK’s process of defining its foreign 
policy priorities within a foreign policy realm clearly torn between the US and Europe. 
Britain’s self-proclaimed role as a bridge builder between the EU and the US has perhaps 
been one way of trying to combine these two remaining circles.343 However, the British 
coordination reflex with the US still remains strong, despite the ever-evolving CFSP system, 
which embeds the UK deeper within the EU foreign policy framework. Blunden has tried to 
explain this “US reflex” by pointing to how the US, in a post-imperial world, becomes the 
UK’s power multiplier.344 This could then explain why the UK still seems to avoid siding with 
the EU against the US, as the American superpower might appear to the UK to be its lifeline 
to great power status. 
As previously mentioned, the UK’s position in between the US and the EU also 
seemed to have an effect on its position in the arms embargo case. The US opposition to the 
lifting left the UK in a position where its special partner’s interests explicitly clashed with 
those of its partners in the EU.345 The previously mentioned US House of Representatives 
Resolution against the embargo lifting346 and the US State Department’s claims that the US 
and EU arms embargoes against China were complementary sanctions,347 clearly 
demonstrated the US opposition. The US’ impact on the British position was perhaps 
explicitly confirmed by the fact that the UK Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, began talking to 
other EU member states about the possibility of postponing the lifting in early 2005.348  
The EU member states’ bilateral relations with China are also possible factors which 
might have influenced the preferences of member states in the embargo discussions. Despite 
arguments about the impossible task for one EU member state to handle China on its own in 
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an increasingly globalised world,349 larger EU member states still compete with each other in 
order to obtain beneficial bilateral commercial ties with China.350 France and Germany’s 
pursuit of major contracts with China in the aviation and high technology field, respectively, 
and the UK’s wish to enter the Chinese financial market, might have prevented the emergence 
of a common and more comprehensive EU China policy.351 These member states’ individual 
pursuits of improved bilateral trade relations with China thus create a myriad of Sino-
European relationships, despite the fact that international trade is under the jurisdiction of the 
Commission and the Common Commercial Policy. This framework, which allows the parallel 
pursuit of national interests, shows how differences between the EU member states’ foreign 
policies might be the main obstacles to creating a more assertive and coherent EU foreign 
policy.352 The reluctance towards establishing a more European foreign policy might also 
possibly be explained by member states’ illusions of foreign policy grandeur, which make 
member states believe their own foreign policy capacity to be greater than a united EU 
approach.353 This illusion of grandeur might perhaps also be found in the speeches of French 
MP Jean-Louis Debré and President Hu in the Assemblée Nationale in January 2004, as they 
both emphasised the importance of their bilateral relationship in their struggle to survive in a 
globalised and Americanized world.354 This difficult co-existence of member state and EU 
foreign policies, within a somewhat vague CFSP framework, becomes even clearer when 
these member states, affected by national parliaments, business lobbies, and various bilateral 
special relationships, assume the Presidency of the European Council for six months. 
5.2 The rotating Presidency of the EU: a Community institution or an 
opportunity for national interest projection? 
The rotating Presidency was, up until the implementation of the Lisbon treaty,355 in charge of 
chairing all meetings in the Council, the European Council and in their respective sub-
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structures. In addition to this extensive task, the country holding the Presidency was also in 
charge of representing the EU in CFSP matters, of informing the European Parliament of main 
decisions and of setting the agenda of the European Council.356 The fact that member states 
assume a Community role for six months, might also prevent an efficient Presidency, related 
to the lack of continuity and a possible national bias.357 The central question remains whether 
the member state holding the Presidency will indeed work “in the service of the Union” or 
whether it will follow a nationally oriented agenda.358 Even though most member states plan 
the Presidency according to traditional foreign policy mechanisms,359  it is also evident that 
there has been a Europeanization of national administration as the execution of the Presidency 
does not just involve the member state’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
The Presidency’s role has been described as a mix between administrative manager, 
agenda setter and consensus builder,360 where the member state holding the Presidency must 
find the fine line between passivity and overstated activism.361 While some member states 
may look at this as a great opportunity to put their imprint on the development of the EU, 
others may see it as a constraint to national priorities and feel that a strictly Community-
oriented manner of running things is expected. The following section looks at how the 
relevant Presidencies acted and possibly shaped the outcome of the arms embargo 
discussions. 
 Italy held the Presidency when the arms embargo debate was initiated in late 2003. 
Even though Hellström claims that the Italian Presidency tried to lift the arms embargo during 
its time in office,362 the only evidence of this was the December 2003 agreement to put the 
issue up for further discussion.363 The lack of a lifting decision could perhaps be explained by 
the fact that the Presidency’s three main priorities were set out to be the conclusion of the 
inter-governmental conference (IGC) on a Constitution for Europe, the achievement of the 
Lisbon strategy, and a re-establishment of the EU’s broken ties with the US after the Iraqi 
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war.364 The last priority, suggests that Italy would not go out of its way to promote the lifting 
of an arms embargo which the US was so clearly in favour of keeping. Di Quirico also 
emphasises Italy’s possible dilemma as he points to how Italian Presidencies of the European 
Council are generally influenced by the tension between Italy’s Anglo-American priorities and 
the Franco-German axis of the EU.365 Being a member state which generally tended to 
promote national interests during its EU Presidencies,366 it is perhaps not that surprising that 
the arms embargo lifting, which would have been an unwanted source of transatlantic tension, 
was not on the top of the Italian Presidency’s agenda. 
 The following Irish, Dutch and Luxembourgian Presidencies, running from January 
2004 until the end of June 2005, however, all proclaimed themselves to be “in the service of 
the Union.”367 These smaller member states’ “follower attitude” was perhaps also emphasised 
as they seemed to be following the already decided review process of the arms embargo. The 
programme of the Irish Presidency pointed to the 2004 EU enlargement as its main priority, 
and illustrated, as previously noted, how the EU was preoccupied elsewhere at the time of the 
arms embargo debate.368 And even though human rights were listed as one of the top CFSP 
priorities in the annual programme of the 2004 Irish and Dutch Presidencies,369 Ireland 
avoided taking sides with the human rights promoters in the arms embargo case during its 
time in office.370  
During 2004, the EU seemed to be arriving at a consensus in the arms embargo case, 
as the December 2004 Dutch Presidency conclusions invited the next Presidency to finalise 
the well-advanced work on the lifting.371 The failure of previous Dutch EU Presidencies’ 
attempts to promote a more assertive EU human rights policy, might also explain why the 
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Netherlands did not try to pursue the human rights aspect of the arms embargo case, despite 
their history of international norm entrepreneurship.372 
Luxembourg’s tendency of assuming the view of the EU majority, might explain why 
the arms embargo issue, originally set to be finalised in the first months of 2005, seemed to 
slip off the table as the fragile EU consensus gradually crumbled. Svensson further explains 
this by arguing that it is impossible for a Presidency to side with the opposition when there is 
another clear EU majority.373 The increased US pressure to keep the embargo, together with 
the Chinese adoption of the Anti-Secession Law in March 2005, seemed to halt the 
finalisation of the arms embargo issue as it created even more internal division in the EU.  
 As the UK assumed the EU Presidency in July 2005, its priorities were economic 
reform, social justice, security and a strengthened European role in the world, especially via 
strategic partnerships with Africa and the Middle East.374 It therefore seems that the UK based 
its EU Presidency’s foreign policy objectives on central issues of British foreign policy: 
relations with its former colonies in Africa and the Middle East. This might suggest that both 
the UK and Italy chose a more nationally oriented approach to its Presidency, compared to the 
three preceding Presidencies, which thus confirms Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace’s claim that 
larger member states more frequently promote national interests during their Presidencies.375 
The fact that the UK seemed to keep away from addressing the arms embargo case in 
the latter half of 2005, emphasises how the avoidance of a subject, and not just the advocacy 
of particular national interests, could also be an example of promoting national interests.376 
Svensson argues that a Presidency will never lead the EU in a direction contrary to its own 
convictions, and this might have been the case as the UK refrained from following the already 
EU agreed process of reviewing the status of the arms embargo.377 As previously mentioned, 
Tony Blair supported the lifting of the arms embargo in 2004, provided that the EU Code of 
Conduct would be strengthened, but the US pressure on the UK Government appeared to have 
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taken its toll when the issue was to be finalised in 2005.378 It was reported that an increased 
US pressure was indeed the reason why the UK Government abstained from putting the arms 
embargo on the agenda during its 2005 Presidency.379 Furthermore, White refers to a recurring 
UK tendency of promoting transatlantic interests during its Presidencies as he points to how 
the 1998 UK Presidency promoted the successful finalisation of extensive EU-US trade 
agreements.380 It might thus seem that the UK’s US coordination reflex remained strong in 
spite of its temporary Community role. As previously mentioned, this might also be an 
example of Moravcsik’s claim about how other states’ policies and interests might affect the 
actions of other states.381 The interdependence factor in foreign policy shows how 
domestically defined foreign policies might have to be adjusted when operating in an 
environment where several other states also want to achieve their foreign policy objectives. 
Consequently, the US’ influence here seemed to play an important part as the arms 
embargo debate appeared to be pushed off the EU agenda in late 2005.382 The close 
connection between the UK and the US Governments, strengthened by their cooperation in 
the “War on Terror,” appeared to have provided a channel of influence all the way into the 
agenda setting of the Presidency of the European Council and demonstrated the continued US 
impact on European affairs. Another source of US influence might have been the 
abovementioned powerful links between US and UK defence industries and the British 
defence companies’ concerns for how a lifting would affect their industry’s transatlantic 
cooperation. The prominent place of British defence companies within the UK Government 
thus strengthens this second and initially non-governmental channel of US influence.  
The US’ impact on European politics might also be found in the fact that the arms 
embargo issue was never really taken up again. This time it was not just because of the US’ 
direct influence, but because of the European leaders’ more personal views of the US. British 
MEP Charles Tannock claimed in June 2005 that the fact that one of the most fervent 
supporters of the lifting, Chancellor Schröder, had been severely weakened domestically 
might also bring the arms embargo debate to a natural end.383 The November 2005 change of 
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Chancellor in Germany, from the lifting advocate Schröder, to the more human rights-oriented 
Atlanticist Christian Democrat, Angela Merkel, might have affected the process considerably. 
Also, as Nicolas Sarkozy took over as President of France after Chirac in 2007, the two 
member states, which had been the drivers of the lifting campaign, France and Germany, 
found themselves under the leadership of a much more US-friendly duo. This change of 
leaders also seemed to dampen the two countries’ habit of criticising the US, the most recent 
example being the Iraqi war and the following transatlantic drift in 2003.384 Even though 
China still continues to demand a lifting of the embargo,385 and Baroness Catherine Ashton 
has repeatedly pushed for a lifting of the embargo after she became the High Representative 
for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, there does not seem to be any member 
state willing to assume the leading role of the lifting campaign any more.386 This could 
possibly be explained by the fact that the continued US opposition to the lifting would 
dissuade the now more pro-US Governments of France and Germany. This change of 
direction clearly points to how important individual characteristics and convictions of Heads 
of State or Government might be for the direction of the respective member states’ foreign 
policies. In addition to the US opposition to a lifting, the EU’s time consuming economic and 
monetary challenges following the financial crisis of 2008, also contributed to keeping the 
arms embargo off the agenda as the EU mainly focused on internal affairs. 
While it is possible to blame the EU’s indecision in the arms embargo case on the 
UK’s avoidance of the issue, the adoption of the Chinese Anti-Secession Law and the Chinese 
failure to ratify the United Nations’ Covenant of Civic and Political Rights have also been 
pointed to as reasons why the lifting slipped off the EU agenda in late 2005.387 This was 
especially the case in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands where the socialisation effect, 
which seemed to have muted the national opposition, weakened as the EU’s consensus was 
shaken by the prospect of an Anti-Secession Law.388 It is possible to argue that while human 
rights violations had already been one of the public and national parliament’s main arguments 
against the lifting, the Anti-Secession Law no longer made it possible for national 
governments to circumvent these arguments in favour of economic interests. Even though the 
US opposition to the lifting clearly influenced the EU member states in various ways, the 
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Chinese adoption of the Anti-Secession Law may thus have tipped the scale in favour of 
keeping the embargo. The abovementioned priority of economic growth and trade in EU-
China relations, which motivated the lifting campaign, thus seemed to lose its momentum as 
the human rights aspect suddenly became clearer with the Anti-Secession Law. However, it is 
also possible to argue that the member states’ abandonment of the lifting might not have been 
motivated by the human rights situation in China, but by yet another economic concern, such 
as the defence industry’s loss in case of a potential cut in technology transfers from the US. 
Also, this Anti-Secession Law could be considered as a more acceptable reason for 
postponing the lifting, than the “mere” influence of Europe’s big brother, the US. At least, the 
UK might have found it easier to obtain support for postponing the lifting on the grounds of 
human rights concerns, rather than because of a threatening US’ discontent. 
After having considered several factors of the member states’ national foreign policies, 
the governments, and the Prime Minister especially, seemed to remain the key decision 
makers in the arms embargo case. The ”primeministerialisation” had concentrated foreign 
policy around the office of one person and demonstrated the prominence of the European 
Council in the CFSP. Among the Governments influencing EU foreign policy, it still seemed 
that the ”big three” were the most influential member states. Also, even though national 
parliaments in most cases had monitoring mechanisms for foreign policy and may have had 
an impact on foreign policy in some more open member states, the general picture 
demonstrates how governments seemed to decide the respective member states’ position in 
the lifting debate.389 Business interests also proved to be able to affect foreign policy, as 
economy and trade interests increasingly became important in member states’ foreign 
relations. Special interest and bilateral relationships were also emphasised as important 
sources of foreign policy, as the UK-US special relationship seemed to have affected the 
British European Council Presidency’s dropping of the arms embargo debate. This shows how 
the “double responsibility” of the Presidency often seems to place the member state in office 
in the difficult position of choosing between national and EU priorities.390  
The next chapter provides a more comprehensive analysis of the importance of the 
different types of actors’ roles in the arms embargo discussions. It also focuses on how and 
whether the theoretical framework chosen for this particular case study, traditional liberal 
FPA, might explain the arms embargo discussions and European foreign policy in general. 
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6.0 European Foreign policy: foreign policy coordination or emerging post-
state EU foreign policy? 
Even though a case study might draw attention to certain general aspects of foreign policy in 
the EU, it is always risky to generalise a specific case in order to explain the bigger picture. 
With this in mind, it is, nonetheless, important to consider whether and how the present 
analysis of the arms embargo case might help explain the general tendency of EU foreign 
policy. Does the answer of this thesis’ research question, about who decided in the arms 
embargo case, contribute to a better understanding of the overall CFSP system? Is it still 
relevant to argue that member states remained the key feature of EU foreign policy, or is there 
a development towards a more supranational and united foreign policy in the hands of 
supranational institutions? Also, have these developments changed European foreign policy 
so substantially that traditional liberal foreign policy analysis (FPA) is no longer applicable? 
 This concluding chapter firstly focuses on whether the member states were indeed the 
main decision making actors in EU foreign policy at the time of the lifting discussions. 
Secondly, it assesses the applicability of traditional FPA to the arms embargo case and 
discusses the need for a new and European FPA. Finally, the chapter concludes by arguing 
that while traditional FPA still has considerable explanatory ability, because of the member 
states’ primacy, the effect of Europeanization and the issue-specificity of EU foreign policy 
must be accounted for in an analysis of EU foreign policy.  
6.1 The foreign policy primacy of member states, with a hint of Europeanization 
The unanimity rule is the main feature of the EU’s CFSP and allows member states to remain 
in control. The potential veto by any of the member states demonstrates the fragility of EU 
foreign policy and leaves practically all foreign policy decisions, apart from the foreign 
economic policy competences of the Community, at the mercy of the different governments in 
the European Council. Spence points to the negative aspect of this as he argues how the often 
difficult process of achieving a consensus on contentious foreign policy issues in the EU leads 
to more member states pursuing their own strategies as the European alternative would be 
considered inefficient and non-desirable.391 That is why it is possible to argue that while 
unanimity ensures the member states’ control over the EU’s foreign policy, it is perhaps also 
evident that the structure of the CFSP itself becomes an obstacle which prevents the creation 
of a more Community-oriented foreign policy. The member states remain the principal actors 
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without any real desire to give up their veto in exchange for coherence. The transfer of power 
and competences to the EU can also be seen as a result of member states’ costs- and benefits- 
assessments where they are more willing to cede powers if the benefit of this is substantial. 
Also, it might be possible that foreign policy is considered a particularly important policy 
area, where the benefits may not be as evident as in other areas. The fact that the member 
states voluntarily decided that a lifting of the 1989 arms embargo would need unanimity in the 
European Council,392 clearly shows how embedded the unanimity rule is within EU foreign 
policy making. One could also argue that the question concerning the embargo still remains 
unresolved partly because of the reservations of some member states, making it impossible to 
arrive at a consensus in 2004-2005. As previously argued, the end of the debate was also 
largely caused by external factors, such as US opposition to the lifting and China’s adaptation 
of the Anti-Secession Law. However, these factors consequently affected the formation of the 
member states’ positions in the European Council. 
 It is also not just the consensus-based decision making process of the EU’s foreign 
policy which points to how important national interests are. The fact that the foreign policy 
agenda seems to be set by the larger EU member states, also exemplifies the primacy of 
member states. Even though the Commission gained shared right to initiative in the foreign 
policy realm with the Maastricht treaty, there was a sense in the Commission that this right 
was not to be used unless it would coincide with a clear consensus among the member 
states.393 Jørgensen also emphasises how EU foreign policy is steered by member states and 
explains how some of the larger and more influential member states form “k-groups” in order 
to set the EU agenda.394 These member states work together in a sort of “minilateralism” in 
order to project their interests and to get their positions multilaterally accepted and legitimised 
within a larger institutional setting.395 Jørgensen especially points to the Franco-German axis 
as one of these recurring “k-groups.”396 France and Germany’s abovementioned fervent 
advocacy in favour of the arms embargo lifting may thus exemplify a “k-group” in action and 
demonstrate how member states’ national foreign policy objectives may influence the EU 
agenda.  
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Even though member states seemed to remain in control of EU foreign policy, national 
foreign policy of these member states can now be said to be even less the result of an 
exclusively domestic foreign policy interest formation. Increased international 
interdependence embeds member states’ national foreign policies within a broader framework 
and affects their preference formation. Ekgren refers to this embeddedness by pointing to how 
the execution of the Swedish Presidency in 2001 showed how closely linked Swedish and 
European administrations were.397 These strong links are also clear in the case of the UK, 
where almost forty years of EU membership have embedded the British administration deeply 
within the CFSP structure.398 While this might appear to constrain British foreign policy, 
considering the potential conflicts of interests between its European and Transatlantic 
priorities, the CFSP embeddedness has been argued to be a way for Germany to normalise its 
foreign policies.399 
 This framework of interconnected national foreign policy structures and the increased 
contact between member states, thus create the perfect setting for a possible Europeanization 
of national foreign policies. The national government representatives’ constant contact with 
EU officials or with their counterparts in other member states leads to a socialisation which 
might again lead to a change in their preference formation.400 Wong defines this socialisation 
in the EU as a “reflex communautaire,” where national government representatives no longer 
exclusively adhere to their national environment.401 In the arms embargo case, Sweden’s 
decision not to veto the lifting despite considerable domestic opposition, could be pointed to 
as evidence of this socialisation, as it seemed to be more important for the Swedish 
Government to behave according to the EU’s ”logic of appropriateness,” than to adjust its 
foreign policy position according to domestic opinion.402 The Swedish Government’s 
abovementioned wish to consolidate its “EU credentials” clearly points to how the 
expectations of its EU counterparts seemed to matter more than the view of its domestic 
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constituents, and consequently, illustrates how this wish to be accepted was an important part 
of its foreign policy preference formation.403 
 In addition to the abovementioned effects of the European context, the Community 
actors’ increased entrepreneurship may lead to a less member state centred EU foreign policy. 
One example of this, is how the EP’s reputation as the main norm entrepreneur in the EU404 
was evident also in the arms embargo case. Its resolution against the lifting,405 as well as 
protests by several MEP’s, show how the EP stated its opposition, in the hope of influencing 
the final outcome.406 Also, members of the Prodi and the Barroso I Commissions, except for 
Commissioner Patten, publicly argued in favour of the lifting.407 The High Representative for 
the CFSP, Solana, also called for a lifting of the embargo,408 and consequently joined the 
abovementioned Community actors in their efforts to influence the debate through declaratory 
diplomacy. This advocacy of actors with limited formal CFSP competences might then 
suggest that there was at least a perceived chance of influence, if not a real one. Kreutz 
addresses this difference between formal and informal powers and points to how the complex 
system of the EU may allow more informal influence as the intertwined structures create new, 
informal channels of influence.409 While the influence of actors with formal competences is 
much more clear and explicit, the possible influence of those who do not participate in the 
decision making process could be just as important, but is, nonetheless, much more difficult to 
assess. This is because these actors would mainly rely on influencing the decisive actors 
through rhetorical action. The fact that several Community actors clearly stated their position 
in the arms embargo debate, would arguably demonstrate their belief in their ability to make 
an impact, despite their limited formal CFSP competences and despite the probability of being 
bypassed by the final say of the member states in the European Council. 
6.2 Foreign policy analysis of the EU: domestic focus on the member states or a 
new European framework? 
As previously argued, the changing nature of foreign policy making in Europe, complicates 
the task of finding an appropriate framework of analysis. That is why one must consider how 
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new structures and non-governmental actors may influence the mainly intergovernmental 
process of foreign policy formation, and consequently, how these new elements can be 
incorporated into existing frameworks of analysis. 
6.2.1 Moravcsik’s liberal foreign policy analysis and the arms embargo case 
Moravcsik argues that “an understanding of domestic politics is a precondition for, not a 
supplement to, the analysis of the strategic interaction among states.”410 Moravcsik’s liberal 
agency-based FPA approach thus emphasises the importance of domestic actors in the 
formation of national foreign policies, before they enter the international stage.411 In an EU 
setting, this approach is therefore focused on what happens within each member state and how 
this affects the member state’s final negotiation position in the European Council. 
In the arms embargo case, it seems like Moravcsik’s FPA framework can still be 
applied, even though the debate took place within an EU context where domestic sources of 
foreign policy might not be the only ones. Moravcsik’s first criterion of his liberal, agency-
based FPA, the primacy of societal groups in national foreign policy formation, emphasises 
how groups within a society work towards exporting their preferences to the governing elite 
through collective action and political exchange.412  Here, these groups’ preferences are “prior 
to politics” and thus fixed before any political debate. The Swedish Left Party and Green 
Party’s strong advocacy against the lifting may serve as an example where groups in the 
domestic society might have affected the government’s position through their pre-political 
tradition of human rights advocacy.413 However, the arguments of issue-specific interest 
groups in the UK, such as Amnesty International, Saferworld and CAAT, appeared to have 
less direct influence on the Government’s position. This might suggest that the source of 
domestic pressure is more vital in deciding how influential this pressure is, rather than the 
sheer number of people disagreeing with a given government position. The fact that the Left 
Party and the Green Party, which strongly opposed the lifting of the embargo, were also the 
two supporting parties of the Swedish minority Government, suggests that the Government 
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had to take their views into consideration in order to secure support in the Riksdag and remain 
in office. While this illustrates how the Swedish Government was affected by the country’s 
more open and corporatist tradition, the largely two-party system of the UK and the 
centralised presidential system of France might have made these respective Governments less 
dependent upon support from domestic groups. It is thus possible to argue that while the 
relationship between the government and the society may shape national governments’ 
preferences, the degree of influence of these societal groups varies according to country and 
issue area. 
Moravcsik’s second point of analysis considers how governments act as 
representatives of groups within their respective societies. He illustrates this by arguing that 
government representatives are “embedded in domestic and transnational civil society, which 
decisively constrains their identities and purposes.”414 In the arms embargo case, the strong 
institutionalised links between the UK Government and the defence companies may suggest 
that there is an increased chance that the Government would listen to and perhaps represent 
the interests of this particular group. The fact that both the British Government and the British 
defence companies’ reluctance towards the lifting was based on a fear of how the lifting might 
affect their relationship with the US, suggests that their positions were linked. Dover 
emphasises the strong links between foreign policy and national defence companies, and one 
could perhaps argue that the UK Government might have acted as the defence companies’ 
representatives as it ultimately, following US pressure, remained hesitant towards a lifting of 
the embargo.415 It has also been argued that the French Government was under heavy pressure 
from French defence companies, who, contrary to their British counterparts, generally 
favoured a lifting of the embargo.416 Also, the increasingly popular practice of having 
business leaders accompany Heads of Government or State on their state visits to China, 
while the latter finalised important trade agreements, demonstrates how Governments could 
act as representatives of certain business interests in their respective countries.  
The tendency of accommodating major domestic interest groups may also be 
strengthened by the governments’ wishes to remain in office with the help from these said 
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groups.417 This could perhaps explain why Schröder and Chirac, both on their way out as 
national leaders in 2005, were more willing to defy domestic opposition, than their 
counterparts in the UK and in Sweden, who both still relied on public support to remain in 
office. Schröder and Chirac’s inevitable exit as Heads of Government and State became clear 
as Schröder was confronted with a parliamentary motion of confidence and was defeated in 
the September 2005 federal election. This placed Schröder in a difficult position during the 
lifting debate in late 2005, as it was clear that Angela Merkel would assume office as German 
Chancellor in November that same year. As Chirac had only two years left of his maximum of 
years in office in 2005, he did not have to worry about accommodating domestic opposition in 
order to win the next presidential election. On the other hand, the fact that the British and 
Swedish Prime Ministers, Blair and Persson, had both general elections coming up at the time 
of the arms embargo debate, in May 2005 and 2006 respectively, might thus explain why they 
seemed more willing to take domestic groups’ opinions into account, as their support might 
help them secure another term in office.  
The importance of interdependence is the third core assumption of liberal FPA, which 
emphasises how national interests must be considered in relation to its international context. 
The possible constraints created by one state’s national interests upon another state’s actions 
is a typical example of how interdependence may alter previously defined national 
strategies.418 The fact that the lifting debate was to be resolved by unanimity in the European 
Council, left the pro-lifting member states dependent upon the actions of hesitant member 
states, which had the ability to block such a lifting. This illustrates how some member states’ 
strategies might be affected by other member states’ preferences. The unanimity rule and the 
possibility of a single-state veto thus demonstrated how national interests of one member state 
could constrain the other states’ room to manoeuvre. Furthermore, this illustrates how the 
international environment must be accounted for, even in traditionally state controlled foreign 
policies. Also, the US’ threats of imposing restrictions on technology transfers from US to 
European defence companies illustrate Moravcsik’s interdependence emphasis on negative 
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policy externalities, where one government’s policy creates costs for a group outside their 
national jurisdiction.419  
While traditional liberal FPA might help explain the abovementioned aspects of the 
arms embargo case and the respective parties’ positions, there are also elements which cannot 
be explained by this framework. Liberal FPA’s focus on the importance of domestic actors 
might be challenged as the increasing ”primeministerialisation” gives the Prime Minister a 
“gate keeping”-role in national foreign policy, which may limit the other domestic actors’ 
influence.420 BBC’s Kershaw pointed to this ”primeministerialisation”-effect as he argued that 
Blair’s ten years as the UK’s Prime Minister had led to an increased presidential nature of the 
British political system, which consequently had “eroded the authority of the House of 
Commons.”421 In the arms embargo case, the importance of the Prime Minister, or in this case 
the Chancellor, also became evident as Schröder vowed to push for a lifting despite strong 
parliamentary opposition.422 This primacy of one single person would also increase the chance 
of possible socialisation effects resulting from his or her regular participation in the European 
Council, where the views of European colleagues might become more important than 
domestic opinion. 
Another element of the arms embargo case, which traditional FPA has difficulties 
explaining, is the role of supranational EU actors. Despite the fact that they do not possess 
formal competences in CFSP, they are still a part of the EU’s foreign policy system, and 
might influence decisions taken by member states.423 It is therefore important to include them 
in the analysis of European foreign policy, even though it might be more difficult to find 
proof of this informal influence. Their supranational nature is difficult to place within the 
traditional state-oriented FPA and the only way to do this would perhaps be through an EU 
adaption of traditional FPA where the EU replaces the state’s role, and where the EP and the 
Commission assume national positions they would hypothetically have in an EU state. If one 
is to transfer Moravcsik’s liberal FPA to the European level, one could argue that the 
Commission’s promotion of business interests could parallel a national government 
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representing a subset of society, businesses trading with China, and thus include the 
Commission as an agent acting as a representative of trade and commercial interest.424 Even 
though Hill opens up for a redefinition of traditional FPA, where the primary actor is an 
independent but not necessarily a state actor,425 it is evident that this transformation of 
traditional FPA remains a very experimental approach since the EU does not yet have the 
clear characteristics of a state.  
As well as the increased foreign policy role of the Prime Minister and the 
supranational nature of EU actors, the Europeanization effect is also excluded by Moravcsik’s 
liberal agency-based FPA. The main elements of Europeanization within foreign policy; 
projection of national preferences to the EU level, adaptation and convergence of national 
positions and, lastly, the socialisation effect,426 all point to potentially important foreign 
policy influences within a country belonging to the closely knit EU framework. Socialisation 
is perhaps the less tangible aspect of Europeanization, which deals with how government 
representatives, who have regular contact with their European counterparts, are being 
socialised into a community where their previously defined preferences might change 
according to the EU’s “logic of appropriateness.” This clearly contradicts liberal FPA’s claim 
that national foreign policies are fixed preferences not subject to change, and emphasises the 
social-constructivist foundation of socialisation theory within Europeanization. A clear 
example of this during the arms embargo debate was the fact that Sweden, despite substantial 
domestic opposition and a tradition of human rights promotion, decided not to veto the lifting 
of the arms embargo. As mentioned above in chapter five, this was explained by the fact that 
Sweden, being a more recent EU member, wished to consolidate its place within the CFSP by 
following an assumed majority within the European Council and by adapting to a perceived 
”logic of appropriateness.”427 Another example of potential socialisation effects, might be the 
fact that two other Northern European member states, Denmark and the Netherlands, also 
seemed to adapt their position to the emerging lifting consensus in the EU in 2004, even 
though human rights advocacy traditionally was one of their main foreign policy objectives.428 
Traditional liberal FPA does not seem to include any frameworks of analysis able to account 
                                                 
424Andrew Moravcsik. (1997). “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics.” 
International Organization, 51(4), pp. 513-553. 
425
 Christopher Hill. (2003). The changing politics of foreign policy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
426
 Reuben Wong. (2010). ”The Europeanization of FP.” in C. Hill and M. Smith. International relations and the 
EU (2nd Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 149-170. 
427
 Les Miles. (2000). “Sweden and Finland.” in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.).The foreign policies of 
European Union member states. New York: Manchester University Press, Chapter 10, pp. 181-203. 
428
 Nicola Casarini. (2006, October). ”The evolution of the EU-China relationship: from constructive 
engagement to strategic partnership.” European Union Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper, 64. 
88 
 
for this socialisation effect, as it would perhaps instead have explained the Swedish reluctance 
towards a lifting veto by pointing to the human rights advocacy of Swedish societal groups. 
The possible redefinition of values and preferences, which happens during a socialisation 
process, thus points to a central aspect of European foreign policy formation which might be 
neglected in the case of a purely domestically focused FPA. 
6.2.2 A new framework of foreign policy analysis for the EU? 
Because of these potential shortcomings of traditional liberal FPA, there have been calls for a 
new and transformed FPA more suitable for a Europeanized foreign policy environment.429 
Knodt and Princen suggest one type of adapted FPA as they point to how a general shift from 
actors to process in FPA might make it easier to analyse the individual foreign policy 
processes of the EU, without having to regard for its much disputed “actorness.”430 However, 
it is also difficult to imagine the emergence of a new FPA framework that would be able to 
include the underlying structures and elements of this complex foreign policy system. This 
complexity is illustrated by how the previously mentioned co-existence of two different 
policy regimes within the EU’s foreign policy framework, one Community-based and one 
largely intergovernmental, creates a type of dualism, where the actors’ competences vary 
according to which type of regime the case belongs to. White also acknowledges this 
differentiation of EU foreign policy, but presents three different branches of European foreign 
policy: foreign economic policy, CFSP and the member states’ foreign policies.431  
This very case-by-case configuration of the European foreign policy system thus 
suggests that as long as EU foreign policy remains as issue-specific as this, it would be nearly 
impossible to find one FPA framework that would be able to explain all these different 
aspects. The gradual overlap of the three abovementioned branches of European foreign 
policy also complicates the search for one coherent theoretical framework as the system 
remains intertwined and differentiated at the same time. The Commission’s very different 
roles in foreign economic policy, where it is the main negotiator, and in CFSP, where it only 
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has a shared right of initiative, show how each given issue decides which actors should be the 
main point of analysis. As previously mentioned, Larsen also agrees with this issue-specific 
European FPA as he presents three co-existing European FPAs: traditional, transformed and 
post-modern FPA.432 Here, the different actors’ levels of engagement decide which one of the 
three approaches would be suitable for every case.  Traditional FPA is applied to cases with 
strong articulation of national foreign policy and where the EU is considered just another 
international organisation. Transformed FPA would help explain cases where the EU 
dominates the field. Lastly, post-modern FPA is applied to cases where both the EU and 
member states actively advocate their foreign policy interests. The latter is perhaps therefore 
the most complex version of Larsen’s analyses, as it encompasses both member state and 
Community systems in a double analysis. This would also confirm the need for considering 
both member state and Community actors in my analysis of the arms embargo case, as the 
active engagement of both types of actors was evident. Consequently, it is possible to argue 
that an issue-specific approach to European foreign policy is necessary as long as there are 
several parallel regimes of competences and relevant actors within the European foreign 
policy system. As long as foreign economic policies and the CFSP co-exist in this state of 
dualism, it is difficult to operate with one FPA of the EU. The question is thus whether this 
dualism may be circumvented in the future, as a consequence of how the 2009 Lisbon Treaty 
abolished the EU’s three-pillar structure and launched a European diplomatic service.433  
Despite the challenge of a differentiated European foreign policy system, the primacy 
of member states in the CFSP and in the arms embargo case, could however, suggest that it is 
indeed possible to explain much of this case based on Moravcsik’s traditional liberal FPA 
approach. The fact that one member state could have single-handedly vetoed the whole case 
makes it important to look at the domestic sources of this position. This importance of the 
national positions thus advocates a more general and IR-oriented FPA as Moravcsik discards 
the need for a special European FPA: “although the EC is a unique institution, it does not 
require a sui generis theory.”434 The argument for the continuation of traditional FPA is also 
supported by the fact that as long as the CFSP is largely intergovernmental, the EU’s foreign 
policy remains a result of EU member states’ foreign policy coordination rather than a set of 
supranationally defined foreign policy objectives. 
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Even though the traditional and domestically oriented FPA framework seems to 
capture much of the EU’s foreign policy as member states remain the primary actors, it is 
also, as previously argued, important to consider the Europeanization effect. In the arms 
embargo case, the Swedish Government, on the one hand, seemed to be affected by this 
Europeanized socialisation as they discarded domestic opposition in favour of fitting into the 
EU’s logic of appropriateness. On the other hand, the UK Government did not seem that 
socialised within the EU by the end of the debate, as they went from hesitation to support and 
then back to hesitation when it came to the lifting of the arms embargo. This shows how 
different member states are differently affected by Europeanization and that the scope of this 
additional explanatory factor to traditional FPA must be adjusted to each member state. 
Manners and Whitman explain this by pointing out that the smaller the member state’s foreign 
policy administration system is, the more affected it will be by Europeanization and then 
especially socialisation.435 Consequently, this might explain how foreign policies in Sweden, 
Denmark and the Netherlands seemed to have been affected by EU socialisation, while the 
“big three,” France, Germany and the UK, with larger foreign policy structures of their own, 
appeared to have been less Europeanized and less influenced by how the rest of the EU 
wanted them to behave. Europeanization theories thus point to an additional way of 
explaining national foreign policy formation within the EU. Furthermore, this suggests that 
the best way to analyse member state dominated EU foreign policies would be to add a 
consideration for Europeanization effects to Moravcsik’s traditional domestic FPA. 
6.3 Concluding remarks 
The arms embargo case showed how member states were still the main decision makers of the 
CFSP, while they themselves also were subjected to the Europeanization effects of European 
integration. The halt of discussions and the dropping of the subject followed a period of 
increased disagreement among the member states, which eventually proved to be too 
substantial to be worked out.436 The default unanimity process shows the difficulties of 
obtaining a consensus in an expanding EU, where member states range from nuclear and 
neutral states to states that have only recently emerged from the USSR’s grip. As previously 
mentioned, the structure of the CFSP itself could be said to be the main obstacle to the 
emergence of a more coherent EU foreign policy, as it relies on a difficultly obtained 
consensus. Foreign policy’s prominent role amongst other less contentious policy areas, also 
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demonstrates its close connection to the external sovereignty of the state and that this is an 
area where the member states’ powers, inherent in the unanimity rule, are not easily, if ever, 
given up. This also emphasises the gap between European foreign policy and the otherwise 
largely quality majority voting (QMV)-based EU system. A change of decision-making 
procedures might then change the whole field of European foreign policy, as the unanimity 
rule possibly leaves the discussions at an impasse, while QMV encourages compromise 
through a process of intergovernmental bargaining. It is difficult to try to assess 
counterfactually the outcome of the arms embargo case if the European Council decisions had 
been QMV-based. However, it is possible that a QMV-based lifting decision might have been 
marked by the general tendency of majority decisions in the EU, where vague definitions, 
side-payments and member state opt-outs often occur. 
The US’ seemingly large impact on the arms embargo case, through influential links 
with member states, such as the UK, also points to the US as an additional obstacle to the 
development of a more coherent EU foreign policy. The fact that the US’ position is still able 
to fuel disagreements among EU member states, as in the arms embargo case and more 
notably in the Iraqi war in 2003, illustrates how all EU member states do not always see their 
EU partners as their principal allies. Consequently, the dynamic between member states may 
affect the overall outcome of a foreign policy case in the EU. It is here possible to argue that 
the “camps” from the disagreements over the Iraqi war might have somewhat reappeared in 
the arms embargo case, seeing that the UK again eventually sided with the US, while France 
and Germany seemed more than willing to position themselves in opposition to the US.437 The 
fact that member states did not automatically side with fellow member states in foreign policy 
matters may also suggest that it is not the US itself that is limiting a coherent EU foreign 
policy, but the member states’ lack of belief in an effective and efficient EU foreign policy. 
These internal differences in the EU thus suggest that even though it might seem clear 
that it was the member states and not the Community institutions who remained the key 
decision makers in the arms embargo case, it is also necessary to identify the decisive actors 
within this group of states in order to provide a more comprehensive analysis. In the arms 
embargo case, France and Germany were clearly the member states who decided to put the 
lifting of the embargo on the agenda,438 but the fact that it was not lifted, may imply that they 
did not remain the main decision makers throughout the process. The UK’s avoidance of the 
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subject during its 2005 Presidency, arguably due to US pressure, thus suggest that it was the 
UK which eventually decided the outcome of the arms embargo case. 
 In the arms embargo case it is also possible to see how different actors behave 
differently based on their position. As previously mentioned, Kreutz argues that an actor’s 
position depends on whether it possesses an “insider” or “outsider” role.439 This is clear in the 
case of EU foreign policy, where domestic actors are increasingly being left on the outside as 
decisions take place in the Prime Minister’s office and in the European Council. The 
“outsiders” of the arms embargo case, with limited formal competences, such as national 
parliaments, the EP and other Community actors, also seemed to adopt a more direct and 
possibly controversial stance, as they would not have to take part in the unanimity 
negotiations in the European Council. This is also a central argument for Airoldi, as she points 
to how the directly elected EP allows a broad range of MEPs, representing different fractions 
of European society, to advocate, and perhaps get the EP to adopt, certain positions which 
might have been considered too controversial for an institution “inside” the foreign policy 
decision making structure.440 
 The application of traditional liberal FPA to the arms embargo case proved that while 
this approach could explain a number of aspects of the member states’ positions, it was not 
able to account for the Europeanization effects or for the advocacy of Community actors. 
While the latter might not have been decisive in this case, the Europeanization effect may add 
a whole other dimension to explaining preference formation at the national-European level. 
That is why it seems justifiable to maintain the traditional FPA framework, with an added 
Europeanization element, as long as European foreign policy remains member state 
controlled. One could also argue that the absence of a united and coherent EU foreign policy 
leads to the absence of a comprehensive FPA framework for the EU and its member states. 
 This continuation of traditional FPA of the EU would, however, be problematic in the 
case of more economic related foreign policies of the Union. Foreign economic policy has 
been the prerogative of the Commission since the establishment of a Common Commercial 
Policy in the Rome Treaty, and stands in clear contrast to the member state controlled policies 
of the CFSP. The abovementioned traditional FPA with an added Europeanization element 
would thus perhaps not be a sufficient framework of analysis for the EU’s foreign economic 
policy. It would perhaps be difficult for this framework, based on the primacy of the state, to 
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explain the central position of supranational actors. This is also why it is so important to 
acknowledge that the analysis of EU foreign policy must be customised to each case, 
depending on which decision making regime the case belongs to. However, the fact that 
economic and political aspects of foreign policy have been gradually interlinked since the end 
of the Cold War441 makes it difficult to separate the EU’s two foreign policy regimes 
completely. This may thus question the overall validity of traditional FPA in the EU if the 
intergovernmental and Community-oriented policies become increasingly intertwined. The 
arms embargo case also illustrated this, as the economic aspects of the embargo attracted 
Community actors’ interests, while it still remained under member state CFSP jurisdiction. 
 The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 opened the door to a possible 
unification of these two foreign policy regimes. The abolishing of the EU’s pillar structure 
deleted the explicit separation between intergovernmental and Community policy areas.442 
This, together with the establishment of the EEAS, could then possibly be the beginning of an 
effort to unite the different strands of EU foreign policy. Janos Herman, the chair of the EU’s 
delegation to Norway, seemed to believe in this as he claimed in 2010, that the Lisbon treaty 
would create more effective and efficient foreign policy instruments for the EU.443 One of the 
focal points of further research on foreign policy in the EU would then naturally be the 
development of EU foreign policy after these fundamental structural changes. What effect 
will the abolishing of the pillar structure have on policies, such as the CFSP, which used to be 
clearly separated from the supranational first pillar? Will the establishment of co-decision as 
the default decision making procedure eventually “spill over” to the foreign policy realm?  
 Another point of interest would be to see how the emergence of two new EU actors, 
the non-rotating Presidency of the European Council and the High Representative for the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, may affect the EU’s foreign policy. Will the 
new Presidency lead to a more coherent and long-term foreign policy strategy less affected by 
varying interests of the member states? Can the High Representative and the new President 
together be influential drivers for a more united EU foreign policy despite their limited formal 
competences? Also, as the present thesis’ analysis of four member states’ foreign policies 
may obviously have excluded important factors in EU foreign policy, originating from the 
other twenty-three member states, an updated analysis of the EU27 member states’ foreign 
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policies could be a suggestion for further research. This is also because it appears that the 
major comparative works have been written before the major EU enlargements of 2004 and 
2007.444. 
 When it comes to finding the most suitable FPA framework for foreign policies of the 
EU, one could argue that the debate will always be divided between those remaining faithful 
to a more generalizable and universal FPA and those seeking a customised European FPA for 
a sui generis EU. This is also a recurring aspect of the study of the EU in general and 
Jørgensen points to how researchers must decide whether or not they are satisfied with a less 
generalizable theory in their analyses of European foreign policy.445 The case of the EU and 
its member states’ foreign policies is however a difficult one, as member states seem to hold 
on to their exclusive national competences in foreign policies longer than in other policy 
areas. This may also help explain the fact that the analysis of EU foreign policy may remain 
longer within a traditional framework, whereas other policy areas in the EU may need to be 
analysed within a transformed frame of reference.  
 The present thesis’ analysis thus states that member states still seemed to be the main 
foreign policy decision makers in the EU at the time of the 2004-2005 arms embargo 
discussions. Even though these discussions were set within the EU’s institutional structure, 
the Community institutions were not able to influence the case, because of their limited 
formal CFSP competences. The present analysis also shows how domestic actors may have 
affected the governments’ positions, but that this influence varied greatly according to each 
member state. Lastly, the traditional liberal FPA proved able to explain a number of aspects of 
the case study because of the member states’ foreign policy primacy, but it remains evident 
that there are areas of European foreign policy coordination which will remain unaccounted 
for by this theoretical approach. The Europeanization effect is one of these areas which cannot 
be explained by traditional FPA, but may nonetheless provide an important additional insight 
into the foreign policy formation of member states. The present thesis thus suggests that an 
issue-specific traditional liberal FPA may continue to help explain European foreign policy, 
as long as the CFSP remains intergovernmental, and as long as the Europeanization effects are 
accounted for.   
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